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ABSTRACT
A literature survey concerning the problem of measuring
safety performance was accomplished with primary emphasis to
the problem of evaluating occupational injury and illnesses
safety performance.
Having accomplished this survey a new methodology for
measuring occupational safety performance is proposed based
on "cost" criterion.
Finally an analysis of real safety occupational data is
accomplished since analysis of safety data is considered to
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Although safety is generally recognized as an essential
part in overall system operation, incorporation of safety
procedures and methodology is largely superficial and is
usually directed at maintaining minimum legal standards at
minimum cost. According to Lowrence (1976) safety is defined
as a judgment of the acceptability of risk, and risk, in turn,
as a measure of the probability and severity of harm to human
health. Here it is proper to point out that since cost is
incorporated in any severity of harm to human health, safety
is a function of cost.
A function is safe if its risks are judged to be acceptable
This definition emphasizes the relativity and judgemental
nature of the concept of safety. It also implies that two
very different activities are required for determining how
safe things are:
a. Measuring risk, an objective but probabilistic
pursuit.
b. Judging the acceptability of that risk (judging
safety), a matter of personal, social and economic
value judgement.
Failure to appreciate how safety determinations resolve
into the two discrete activities, is at the root of many mis-
understandings. In one of the most common instances, it gives
rise to the false expectation that scientists can measure

whether something is safe or not. They cannot, of course,
because the methods of the physical and biological sciences
can assess only the probabilities and consequences of events,
not their value to people. Scientists are prepared principally
to measure risks.
Since the taking of both personal and societal risks is
inherent in human activity, there can be no hope of reducing
all risks to zero. Rather, as when steering any course, we
must continually adjust our heading so as to enjoy the greatest
benefit at the lowest risk and cost.
Vital to any business function is an effective cost-control
program - in safety, a program that allows for specific budgeting
for injury cost and equally important, specific accountability
for injuries. This method assumes that employee injury costs
should be controlled just as any other production cost, since
they increase operating overhead, as do the expenses for raw
material, parts, and labor [Miller, 1977].
This is not a cold, inhuman approach to safety. There is
a direct correlation between cost and human suffering. An
accident that causes a great deal of pain and suffering will
also generate high cost and loss of productivity. Thus,
elimination of high-cost accidents will not only save money
but also make the workplace safer and minim.ize the possibility
of accidents that generate suffering [Miller, 1977].
Hammer (1972) in his Handbook of System and Product Safety
has suggested that injury or damage can result from four funda-





c. adverse characteristics of a product
d. unusual environmental conditions.
Recently, personnel concerned with accident prevention
have become more and more convinced that injury or damage from
any of these causes can be prevented or lessened through good
design and planning.
According to Zeller (1970) the interest in accident preven-
tion or reduction has resulted in great public airing of the
problem as well as increased awareness of the need for greater
understanding of the causes if effective remedial action is to
be developed.
There is, however, some confusion as to precisely what
constitutes an accident. Review of accident statistics indi-
cates vastly different criteria for accident reporting. For
this reason, statistical comparisons and statistical analysis
can be accepted only with reservation until there is assurance
that the data sources are comparable. In the broadest defini-
tion any unexpected event might be considered an accident; for
practical purposes, however, prevention is most applicable to
those mishaps in which either damage or injury is sustained.
From the standpoint of cause and prevention, however,
there is often little difference between circumstances that




Another category of mishap - the hazardous condition or
near miss - might also serve to alert personnel to incipient
accidents.
It is axiomatic that effective prevention must have a
focal point of application. This implies that the probable
cause of future accidents can be predicted. This, in turn,
implies that the causes of past accidents have been determined.
In practice, the determination of the cause of an accident is
no simple matter. It becomes increasingly apparent as any
accidental occurrence is examined that there is seldom a
single, clear-cut cause; more often there are multiple causes,
which may be immediate or remote. Typical of this confusion
is the accident involving the drinking driver who, while driving
at excessive speed, leaves the roadway and crashes into some
fixed object. It is very easy to attribute the cause of this
accident to excessive speed, roadway conditions, fatigue, emo-
tional instability, or to the social mores of a group that not
only condones but encourages drinking and driving. This is
quite compatible with the problem society faces when a crime
is committed that, by careful analysis, can be laid directly
at the doorstep of society itself. While this sociological
evaluation of an accident or a crime may result in broad insight,
it is not conducive to the practical determination of causation
that can lead to relatively direct remedial action. For this
reason, it is desirable to define cause so that all accidents




One such definition defines the primary cause of an acci-
dent as the last act or event in a time sequence that made
the accident inevitable from that point. While this, too, is
subject to interpretation, it narrows the possibilities to a
great extent. This kind of definition implies first a primary
cause and, secondarily, contributing causes, with the primary
cause by implication being the most important or, at least,
the most proximate factor. This approach has the advantage
of having one cause for each accident, which makes statisti-
cal manipulation simpler.
By contrast, other approaches list all causes without
attempting to assign primacy to one, thus permitting the
evaluation of all causes collectively without previously
defined relative importance.
Unfortunately, even after critical evaluation has led to
a determination of accident causes, the assessed cause may be
a statement of what occurred rather than why it occurred.
In the ultimate analysis of course, accident prevention must
be based on why rather than what.
The most commonly designated cause of accidents is human
error. In accidents where material failure is recognized, it
is often quite possible to continue tearing down the equipment
until the precise portion that failed is isolated and the
cause of the failure whether it be corrosion, stress, faulty
load conceptualization, or other factors, can be determined
and redesign proposed. In cases of human error, however, the
static statement that a human being failed provides no guidance
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to future improvement. The need to reduce human error to its
basic constituents as a means of obtaining insight into the
causes of these failures has resulted in various approaches
to segmenting human behavior for analytical purposes.
A more fruitful approach is to analyze human error in
terms of a total man-machine system interaction in which a
temporal continuum serves as the base line from which to
evaluate the human contribution to the mishaps.
The major expense in a typical safety program is accident
prevention. However, the general approach is to treat the
symptom and not the cause of the accident on the basic pre-
mise that accidents are caused when employees create an unsafe
act or condition. This superficial treatment of safety may
arise from the fact that employers incorrectly and greatly
underestimate the costs attributed to the industrial accidents
and injury and also underestimate the role safety plays in the
overall organization.
To put safety in its proper perspective, it must first
be realized that safety and efficiency are products of each
other. That is, the safe establishment is efficient. With
this in mind, safety then becomes a management problem and
not just the concern of the foreman or the supervisor.
There are five basic principles of a safety management
program. These are:
a. Accidents are suggestive of failures in the manage-
ment system.





c. Safety should be managed like any other operational
function.
d. An effective safety program will provide establish-
ment of responsibility and accountability.
e. An effective safety program will define situations
that allow accidents to happen.
Now comes the problem of safety performance measurement.
W. Tarrants (1977) discussed this problem as the problem that
has existed since the very beginning of organized attempts to
control accidents and their consequences. In its most ele-
mentary form, measurement has been defined as "The process
of assigning numerals to objects according to rules" [Stevens,
1951] . When we apply this definition in the safety field, we
are quickly confronted with problems concerning what "objects"
to measure and what "rules" to follow.
As we learn more about the accident phenomenon we change
our traditional concepts of describing it. Since measurement
is primarily a descriptive process, we are in danger of
believing that the description is the real thing and forgetting
the nature of the phenomenon we want to describe. We tend to
latch onto a particular type of measure and use it constantly
which often prevents us from searching for and applying new
measures which better describe the situation.
The progress and maturity of a science or technology are
often judged by whatever success has been achieved in the use
of measures. Measurement, perhaps more than any other single
aspect, has been the principal stimulus of progress in all
15

professional fields. Measurement is the backbone of any
scientific approach to problem definition and problem solu-
tion. Without adequate measurement in the safety field we
cannot describe the safety state of our operations or determine
whether or not our safety programs are really accomplishing
anything. Sound measurement is an absolute prerequisite for
control and both are necessary for prediction. As Tarrants
(1977) suggests, accident control and prediction, valid and
reliable measures of safety performance are essential in
order to
:
a. Locate and describe problem areas,
b. Identify causal relationships,
c. Make decisions concerning the optimum allocation of
accident prevention resources,
d. Evaluate the effectiveness of applied countermeasures
,
and
e. Detect when the system is deteriorating toward
unacceptable limits of control.
The existing measures of safety performance some of which
will be examined does not permit us to achieve these objectives
at an acceptable level of effectiveness.
The purpose of this thesis research is to perform a
literature survey of the various techniques by which safety
program effectiveness is currently measured and to propose
a methodology for the utilization of the recordable occupational
injuries and illnesses data with an application based on the




As suggested earlier, a safety program, like any organi-
zational program must be measured, thus its effectiveness may
be evaluated and its contribution to overall efficiency will
be evident. Managers will compare, justify and make future
predictions on the overall loss prevention strategy.
There are several methods in use of measuring safety
performance effectiveness like frequency and severity rates,
critical incident techniques, control charts, learning curves,
safety sampling. Double Average Comparison Technique (DACOM)
,
System Analysis Techniques etc.
A discussion of these methodologies is presented below.
A. FREQUENCY AND SEVERITY RATES
Frequency and severity as discussed by Simonds and
Grimaldi (1963) are accepted standards by which a company
can appraise its industrial injury record and set goals for
achievement. Very roughly, these terms refer, respectively,
to the relative frequency of occurrence of major injuries,
-on the one hand, and the total days lost, plus time charges
for deaths and permanent impairments resulting from major
injuries, on the other. It is important to be able to com-
pare the injury record of one dividision with that of another
in the same company, or of the company for the current year
with its performance in preceding years, or of one company
with other concerns in the same industry. For these reasons
17

and to facilitate the holding of contests among companies to
stimulate accident-prevention efforts, the American Standards
Association initially had established precise bases for com-
puting frequency and severity rates (Z16.1 Code). In their
calculations of safety performance based on rates, Simonds and
Grimaldi have taken into account only disabling injuries. A
single safety index developed by Western Electric was pre-
sented by Gilmore (197 0) that is:
OCT - C X 1,000,000
^^-^
~ 16 X D X P
where
:
SSI = Single Safety Index
P = Number of plant personnel
D = Days in the period being measured
C = Charges as the total number of calendar days
lost in excess of the first seven calendar
days or 10 percent of Z16.1 schedule (which-
ever is greater) for both on-and off-the
job injuries.
New concepts have been added to the disabling injury fre-
quency method in this formula, first, there is a dependence
on the severity of the accepted injury. Second, off and on
the job disabling injury have the same weight. Third, the
count on days charged begins with the eighth day of disability.
Fourth, the use of 10 percent of the severity schedule for
days lost under the Z16.1 code recognizes what some consider
inequities within that schedule.
18

A test of a plant's performance by this index might
serve to make managers more aware of the costs of manpower
losses due to accidents.
1. Frequency Rate
The frequency rate is the number of disabling injuries
as defined by the American Standard Association per million
man hours worked. In mathematical terms it can be expressed
as
:
Frequency = Number of Disabling injuries -^
Number of manhours worked
1,000,000
or for ease of computation.
_
Number of disabling injuries x 1,000,000
^ ^ Number of man hours worked
Example 1 . A shipyard concern employed an average of
2700 workers during 1978. Working 40 hours a week for about
50 weeks, each man put in about 2000 hours during the year.
They experienced 65 lost-time injuries during the course of
the period.
Frequency = ^^-^ "^'nnnA^^^ = 12.0 3 per million manhours^ ^ 2700 X 2000 ^
A statement that the shipyard has a frequency rate of 12




In calculating the number of disabling injuries, it should
be noted that it is the number of disabling injuries and not
the number of accidents that is intended for inclusion in the
total. For example in a case of a catastrophic accident
where 25 people were killed in an explosion, 25 disabling injuries
would be included in the total number of disabling injuries for
the unit's experience.
It is generally felt that frequency rates based on a million
or more man-hours are very significant. Obviously, the smaller
the sample, the less reliable is the rate as evidence of
accident-prevention performance. Due purely to chance, the
frequency rate of the shipyard in the above example might vary
considerably from year to year. Nevertheless, the approximate
yearly frequency rate would be a fairly good indication of how
frequently activities got sufficiently out of control to
result in serious injuries.
A frequency rate well over 12 could probably be reduced.
In appraising this frequency rate, however, one should see
how it compares with typical frequency rates in other firms
doing the same type of job.
We know, as yet, nothing about how serious those 65
injuries were. That leads to consideration of a measure
that will be affected by the seriousness of the disabling
injuries.
The bureau of Labor Statistics uses a base of 100 full-
time employees as opposed to the 1 million man-hours used by
the American National Standards Institute (ANSI Standard Z16.1).
20

It is assumed that 100 full-time employees would work 200,000
hours per year (40 hours per week per worker, 50 weeks per
year). Computed on this basis, the injury frequency rate
for the shipyard mentioned would be;
-r • ^ . /•DTr.X 65 X 200,000Injury frequency rate (BLS) =
3 ^qq qqq
—
= 2.4 per 200,000 man-hours.
2 . Severity Rate
The severity rate is the number of days charged for
disabling injuries per million man-hours worked. The time
charges include, first, the number of actual calendar days
(including holidays or plant shutdowns) on which the injured
person was rendered unable to work in temporary total disability
cases. Neither the day of the injury nor the day the injured
worker returns to work is counted in the lost working days.
The method of computing severity as well as frequency
rates are the Z16.1 - 1954 R. 1959 Publication of the American
Standards Association (or American National Standards Insti-
tute ANSI) . In Table I specific time charges are available
which have been established by the American National Standards
Institute for use for all other lost-time cases (deaths,
permanent toal, and permanent partial disabilities)
.
In this group of deaths and permanent impairments actual
time lost from work in a particular case is not considered.




The American Standard Scale of Time Charges
^^ ^ £ -r • Time Charges asNature of Iniury
»-, i_ ^ r^ t j_
-'
-^ Number of Days Lost
Death 6 , QQO days
Permanent Total disability 6 , QQO
Loss of member or complete loss of use of:
Arm above elbow 4,500
Arm above wrist but not above elbow 3,600
Hand above proximal joints of fingers,
but not above wrist 3,000
Thumb at or below distal joint 300.
Thumb above distal, but not above
proximal joint 600
Thumb metacarpal 900
Other fingers: Index Middle Ring Little
Bone damage below distal joint 100 75 60 50
At or above distal but not including
middle joint 200 150 120 100
At or above middle but not above
proximal joint 400 300 240 200
Metacarpal loss 600 500 450 400
Leg above knee 4,500
Leg at or below knee but above ankle 3,000
Foot:
At ankle 2,4 00
Toes
:
Great toe at or below distal joint 150
Great toe above distal but not above
proximal joint 300




Middle phalange 7 5
Proximal phalange 150
Metatarsal 350
One eye (loss of sight) , whether or not
there is sight in the other eye 1,800
Both eyes (loss of sight), in one accident 6,000
One ear (complete industrial loss of
hearing) , whether or not there is hearing
in the other ear 600
Both ears (complete industrial loss of
hearing), in one accident 3,000
Hernia (unrepaired) 50
Note: If hernia is repaired, it is
not counted as a permanent disability




Finger tips: Loss of a finger tip without
traumatic or surgical bone involvement
is not give a standard charge but rather
is treated like any temporary total
disability.
The American Standard Scale of Time Charges




For injuries involving more than one part of the body,
the total may never exceed 6000 days. This was based on the
life expectancy of the average worker times the number of
working days per year. (The Bureau of Labor Statistics does
not include a fixed charge for a fatality.)
With the Bureau of Labor Statistics method, only actual
workdays lost are charged. The Bureau of Labor Statistics
method requires time charges be included even if an employee
is assigned another job; any change in occupation resulting
from a work accident or illness is recordable. Therefore, by
ANSI Z16.1
^. , , . . . .^ ^ total days charged x 1,000,000Disabling mnury severity rate = i ~ r 2
^
-> -^
-^ employees hours of exposure
Example 2 . If in the previous example we had 20 disabling
injuries in the shipyard resulting in 800 days lost, the dis-
abling severity rate would be:
^. , , . . . . ^ ^ 800 X 1,000,000Disabling injury severity rate = —5^400 qqo
= 148 days per million man-hours
The average severity per injury can also be determined.
This can be done in either of two ways
:
, J L- J Total davs lost or chargedAverage days charged = =—z—
^
ir-"'^ ^ -, r-r-^
?
—
^ ^ ^ Total number of disabling in;]uries
800 , « ,, - . . . ,
=
-jrT - 40 (Average seriousness of injuries
24







-^ injury frequency rate
148
.n /A • ^TT—=- = 40 (Average seriousness of
injuries)
Where injury frequency rate for the 20 disabling injuries in
the shipyard is
20 X 1,000,000 ^ -, . , , . ,
1-
.' ^' — = 3.7 per million man-hours
In summary, both rates are needed in appraising safety
performance, but the severity rate particularly should be
examined over a several-year period. For comparison purposes
the frequency rate is best, but since severity is actually a
combination of the frequency and relative seriousness of
injuries, perhaps a low severity rate is the most satisfying
long-run accomplishment.
The evaluation of those rates is based on accident statis-
tics, which, by their very nature, are collected after the
fact. To be statistically valid, accident data must be col-
lected either over long periods of time as already discussed
or from a large number of similar activities. When they must
be collected over a long period, by the time statistical validity
has been established, operating conditions may have changed
so that the data no longer apply.
Accident statistics provide valuable information to regula-
tory agencies and insurance companies. Regulatory agencies
may use such data to identify causative factors and whether
25

additional safety requirements are needed to eliminate them
in future accidents. Insurance companies can use accident
data in determining costs of premiums, which are based on
accident and injury frequencies and severity rates.
Unfortunately, even where accident and injury statistics
can be useful, they are often incomplete, inaccurate, and
therefore incorrect [Hammer, 1976]
.
Concluding the discussion about the frequency and severity
rates as defined by the American National Standards Institute
(ANSI), Standard Z16.1, as the number of disabling injuries
sustained per million man hours worked for the frequency rate,
and as the number of days charged to disabling injuries per
million man hours worked for the severity rate, neither accounts
for the magnitude and duration of the effect created by a
change in the safety program.
Management therefore must wait until accidents occur before
there can be a comparison to determine the effect a change
has made in the safety program. This conclusion is supported
by Duty (1970)
.
B. CRITICAL INCIDENT TECHNIQUE
The simplest way to find out from employees if they are
aware of any hazards in their work environment is to ask them.
The Critical Incident Technique is a means to do this most
effectively. The method is based on collecting information on
hazards, near misses, and unsafe conditions and practices from
operationally experienced personnel. It can be used beneficially
26

to investigate man-machine operational relations and to use
the information learned to improve equipment and operations.
According to Hammer (1972) this technique consists of inter-
viewing personnel regarding involvements in accidents; or near
accidents, difficulties, errors, and mistakes in operation;
and conditions that could cause mishaps. The surveys generally
request the persons interviewed to include their own experi-
ences and also experiences of other personnel whom they have
actually observed. The person is asked to describe all near
Hisses or critical mishaps that he can recall.
In effect the critical incident technique accomplishes
the s^me result as an accident investigation: Identification
through personal involvement of a hazard that has or could
result in injury or damage. When the witnesses who observed
a mishap or near miss, but were not participants, are added
to those who were involved, an extremely large population is
available from which information on possible accident cause
3an be derived.
Even isolated incidents reported by the technique can be
investigated to determine whether corrective action is necessary
or advantageous. However, when a large number of persons are
interviewed regarding similar types of equipment or operations,
similarities begin to appear in reports of hazards and near
misses. Where these indicate deficiencies, difficulties, or
other inadequacies, they can be accepted as indicators of areas
in which improvements are necessary.
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Attempts have also been made to produce similar effective
results in obtaining information through the use of question-
naires to be filled in by selected personnel. This method
has proved to be unsatisfactory for a number of reasons. One
fundamental problem was the need for extreme care in selecting
and phrasing the question. Too often, the person completing
a questionnaire would give the questions interpretations
neither considered nor intended by the person who prepared
them. Any question should be avoided whose answer requires
involved reasoning that is not immediately apparent to the
reader.
The critical incident technique procedure is described by
Tarrands as carried out at one plant of the Westinghouse Com-
pany. The steps are summarized by W. Hammer (1972) as follows:
a. A group of employees with previous experience and
involvement in manufacturing processes and equipment was
selected. Each person included was listed according to various
factors, in order to produce as wide a range of experience as
possible. Representatives were selected randomly from each
factor group.
b. The participants were interviewed and informed of the
study and its objectives. They were given an opportunity to
withdraw from participation.
c. At the end of the interview the participant was given
a copy of the statement on the study and its objectives and
a list of typical incidents gathered at other plants. This
procedure was to stimulate the recall process.
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d. Participants were asked to describe any incident (s)
that they could recall, whether or not they had resulted in
innury or property damage. They were asked whether they re-
called the incident similar to those that had occurred at
other plants, as described on the list they had been provided.
e. Questioning was carried on until human errors or un-
safe conditions in any recalled incident could be described.
Twenty participants related 389 incidents of 117 differ-
ent types. Over 50 percent more potential accident causes
were found by this method than had been identified from acci-
dent records. One participant estimated that almost 70 per-
cent of the problems reported occurred every day, indicating
an almost constant exposure to danger. According to Hammer
(1972) the basis for the Critical Incident Technique is that
it has been estimated that for every mishap there are at least
400 near misses and that for every serious injury that occurs,
there are approximately 600 no loss accidents (incidents) that
should serve as a warning to say that given enough time, it
will occur. Once a potential accident has been reported,
the hazards are corrected so that a real accident will not
occur. As these hazards are eliminated or reduced so should
accident frequency and severity rates.
The major deficiency of this method is that its effective-
ness will be dependent upon all employees reporting those
potential accidents (incidents) in which they are involved.
Usually employees will be reluctant to do so. They are worried
about their supervisors attitude, their own personal records
29

and/or spoiling the company's safety record. Thus data with
some degree of bias are introduced.
C. CONTROL CHARTS
According to Brown (1976) a control chart is a visual
means by which an analyst judges whether a process is in con-
trol or not. The measurements plotted on the chart are those
of any random variable. Thus frequency and severity of acci-
dents, as well as any other intermediate indicator of hazards,
could be plotted. Judgements based upon these plots determine
if the process is in control with respect to the random variable
under consideration.
Figure 1 shows the typical layout of a control chart. The
units of the random variable are given on the vertical scale,
indicating that the height of the plotted point represents the
value of the random variable for the indicated time period.
The time scale, given horizontally, shows when the value occurred.
Although any one value can not be predicted, measurements
of central tendency and spread define the expected concentra-
tion and range of the variable. Thus, if the variable behaves
in a nonrandom way, we can conclude that an outside influence
is affecting the random variable. The most common way of iden-
tifying when this occurs is through the use of an upper and
a lower control limit. These are generally placed at equal
distances above and below the mean line.
The measured values as they are recorded in time are
plotted as indicated in figure 1. A point falling above or




Figure 1: Example Control Chart
(Taken from Brown, D.B. [1976], Pg. 230)
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out-of-control situation, and assignable causes are generally
sought. There are other indications of out-of-control situa-
tions, also. However, prior to discussing these, the means
for obtaining the control limits should be examined.
The procedures for setting control limits are essentially
the same as those for setting the acceptance limits in a test
of hypotheses. The first step involves the establishment of
a level of significance (a) , that is the probability of con-
cluding that the process is out of control when in fact it is
in control. If methods of identifying causes are expensive
and the variable is not critical, a low probability can be
tolerated. However, if an early indication of lack of control
is necessary, then a high probability of this error should be
specified.
Once the value of (a) is determined, the next question
involves the definition of control. Quite often the state
"out of control" occurs in one direction only. In sound-
level readings, for example, rarely is the analyst concerned
with the plant being too quiet. Here only an upper limit
would be required, as it would in most cases of pollution
measurements
.
Other monitoring of processes would require both an upper
and a lower control limit. In either case the value of (a)
chosen will represent the total area of probability in the
out-of-control portion of the chart. The upper and lower
control limits are obtained depending upon the random variable,
its distribution, and the value of (a) chosen.
32

Brown (1976) has suggested in the following example that
the frequency of accidents, above a given severity for a plan,
has a normal distribution with a mean of 6 and a standard
deviation of 1.5. Frequencies for the first 6 months have
been 4, 7, 5, 12, 8 and 6. In his example he allowed for a
0.05 probability of calling a point out of control when it is
not. In this example a situation is said to be "out of con-
trol" when the random variable falls above the upper limit.
However, the analyst chooses to set up a lower limit to pro-
vide possible evidence of a lowering of the accident frequency
Thus the 0.05 probability will be divided, 0.025 above the
upper limit and 0.025 below the lower limit. The upper limit
X — ubecomes: (using z = which "standardize" any normally
distributed random variable)
Upper Limit (U.L.) = X + Zq 025 ^*^x^










and the lower limit also becomes:
Lower Limit (L.L.) = x-Z^^^^Ca)
= 6 - 1.96(1.5) = 3.06
The control chart is given in Figure 2. The fourth month
was obviously out of control, and assignable causes should be
sought. Any subsequent monthly reading that falls out of
control should also prompt an investigation of the plant. In
this example the assumption of normality should be tested
since it does not hold generally. Rather than charting indi-
vidual random variables, whose distributions may be unknown,
often sample means are plotted. By the same procedure Accident-
Severity Control charts may be obtained.
Thus any random variable can be plotted on a control chart.
The construction of the chart is simply a matter of applying
hypothesis testing on a continuous basis. The primary advan-
tage is that continuous visual perception of the random varia-
ble is maintained.
This continuous picture enables the analyst to make judg-
ments not otherwise discernible. This is not limited to the
upper and lower control limits demonstrated above. Other
factors that the analyst can use as indicators of abnormal
operational behavior include:
a. Several points (four or more) in a row on one side of
the m^ean line. The probability of four consecutive points on
4
one side is approximately 0.5 or 0.0625.
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Figure 2: Control Chart
(Taken from Brown, D.B. [1976], pg. 231)
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b. Identifiable cycles. Here two or three years of
history may be required to identify a given month or other
period of time when the operation acts in an irregular manner.
c. Several points in a row, either monotonically increasing
or decreasing away from the mean line. The probability of
this type of trend is difficult to establish. However, since
these points are all on one side of the mean line the probability
will be considerably less than 0.5 , where n is the number of
points exhibiting this characteristic.
In quality control situations, 3a control limits are
generally used, based on the l-in-1,000 value of (a) under
the normal-distribution assumption. The 2a (accidents) and
la lines may also be set up, however, to help the analyst
identify other out-of-control indicators. For example, two
points in a row outside of 2a limits would have an approxi-
2
mate probability of (0.025) = 0.000625, which is about the
same as the probability of one point outside 3a limits, assuming
normality. Although control charts for safety applications
should not be restricted to the a = 0.001 value, the concept
of intermediate lines to identify irregularities is a good
one.
Control charts are used in some states for monitoring
traffic accidents. Overall accident frequencies, as well as
finer breakdowns by severity classifications may be plotted.
However this technique also does not account for the
magnitude and duration of the effect created by a change in
the safety program. Therefore we must wait until accidents
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occur before there can be a comparison to determine the
effect a change has made in the safety program [Duty, 1970]
.
D. LEARNING CURVE
The learning curve method has been used extensively in
production cost analysis. It was first developed by Dr. T.P.
iVright for cost analysis of airplane production. He observed
that the cost of producing each of a series of orders for
airplanes of a particular model diminished as the orders were
filled [Gilmore, 1970].
Experimental application of the learning curve has shown
the effect of learning on the repetitive assemblies of equip-
nent, the effect of incentives on productivity, the effect of
Low- and high-volume production, and other productivity situa-
tions. A logical use of this method would be to determine
the obsolescence of manufacturing processes or the point at
vhich cost improvem.ent ceases unless a significant change is
Tiade in the process or that is replaced with a more modern.
Low-cost process.
In the study of the American petroleum industry an accident-
sxperience learning curve model was developed, which closely
::orresponds to the conventional industrial learning curves.
As discussed by Gilmore (1970) we see that safe perform-
ance of work is also a learning process. Experience should
teach us to do a better job of operating a massive crane to
lift and place steel, or driving a truck etc. But people
don't always learn. The job becomes routine and boring.
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corners are cut, establishes procedures are violated, and
accidents occur. Good safety programs appear so effective
that change seems unnecessary, but even the effective ones
can lose their punch. During orientation, workers are informed
of the safety rules, but these are easily forgotten. Safety
performance should improve as experience increases, programs
improve in quality, job procedures are refined, and effort
is applied. It seems logical that if production costs decrease
as we learn how to produce more efficiently, safety perform-
ance should improve as we learn how to perform work more
safely. Neither just happens; it takes a concernted effort
on a continuous basis to make it so. The learning curve is
just a method to chart the progress of that effort.
According to Dr. Wright the mathematical model for the
learning curve is
Y^ = ai"^ (1)
where
Y. = The cost of the i unit,
a = The cost of the first unit; therefore y = a,
i = The production count beginning with the firs'
unit,
b = The measure of the rate of reduction.
For the learning in safety performance if we represent
the serious innury frequency by (SIF) and the total injury
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frequency by (TIF) and using SIF as the measurement unit
equation (1) becomes
where
SIF^ = SIF t~^ (2)to
SIF = the Serious Injury Frequency at time t.
SIF = the Serious Injury Frequency at the
beginning of time.
t = the accumulated man-hours since beginning;
it can also be shown as million man-hours
or dated years on graph.
b = the measure of the rate of reduction.
As in the original learning equation (1), this model has
the characteristic of describing constant percentage reduc-
tions. Each time (man-hour) increase of a constant percentage
sees an accompanying injury frequency decrease of a constant
percentage. If t^ ^nd t-, are two points in the exposure history
of a work group and t^ > t,, then
SIF^ SIF^ t^~^ t^ ,
2 ^ o 2 ^ (^)-^ (3)
^^^1 SIF t -^ ^^1
^^
o 1
The original safety equation (2) becomes
SIF^ = SIF -^ t^ SIF^ = SIF
t
*-* t^ ^ °
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and by the log transformation we have
b log t + log SIF = log SIF^
or
log SIF. = log SIF - b log t
isrhich is the equation of a straight line with slope -b. The
log transformation of the equation (3) is




-b = the slope (4)log t2 - log t, x/
The learning curve can be constructed on a log-log graph
paper on which SIF is plotted on the vertical ordinate and
the accumulated man-hours on the horizontal ordinate. If the
improvement in performance was steady, SIF values plotted
would form a straight line of negative slope. This slope is
the rate of learning or rate of improvement. These rates
are expressed as a percentage of the no-improvement level of
100 percent. In other words, a learning rate of 80 percent
is an improvement of 2 percent and has a slope equivalent
to a reduction of 20 percent from the initial value or a new
value of 80 percent of the initial value. This is shown on
figure 3 where the 10 percent straight line is the no-improve-







4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Exposure Man-hour Ratio, 2 .^
^
Figure 3: The Learning Rate Curve
(Taken from Gilmore, C. [1970] , pg. 93
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show the corresponding improvements of 10, 20, 3 and 4
percent respectively and those with the positive slope
straight line show the corresponding negative improvement
of 20, 40 and 60 percent respectively.
The rate of progress of the learning us usually described
as that reduction of injury frequency (or whatever) which
occurs when the time quantity is doubled. This then is equal
-b ^2
to a quantity C expressed as a percentage, where —— = C = 2
^1
then




C = z— - the time ordinate ratio
1
-b = the slope of the plotted curve
LR = the learning rate expressed as a decimal.
Making a log transformation and substituting the value
C = 2
-b log 2 = log LR (6)
and substituting (6) into (4) we obtain the equation
(log 2) (log SIF^ - log SIF^)
^°5 ^^ = (log t^ - log t^^) ^^^
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This equation permits, by transposition, the calculation
of reasonable expectations of injury frequency at some future
time so that long and short-range goals can be set and perform-
ance charted against those goals as shown in figure 4. The
equation for predicting or setting a goal in the future comes
by solving (7) for log SIF2 and
(log LR) (log t„ - log t.
)
log SIF2 = j3^-^ i- + log SIF^ (8)
Let us take, for example, a plant which accumulates two
million man-hours each year. On January 1, 1978, the plant
had accumulated 8 million man-hours and had an average SIF of
30 serious injuries per million man-hours for the last quar-
ter of 1977. Point data for one month are quite variable, so
at least three months of accident data are required.
By January 1, 1979, 2 million man-hours more have been
accumulated, bringing the total to 10 million man-hours since
operation began. SIF for the last quarter of 1978 was 27.
What has been the learning performance rate?
Using equation (7)
T TP -
(^^g ^) (^^g ^^^2 - ^^g ^^"l^
_ Uog 2) dog 27 -log 30
^°g ^^ (log t^ - log t^) log 10 - log 8
(0.30103) (1.43136 - 1.477) ^
^ 14914(1.00000 - 0.90309) u.i^^±^
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1964 1965 1966
Figure 4: 1965 Safety Performance (based on serious injury data)




LR = Learning or performance rate = 0.721 or 72%.
Assuming the goal for improvement was to continue through
the coming year at the same rate, what is the goal for SIF at
the end of 1979? Using the relationship (8) and assuming that
two million man-hours will be worked by the same personnel
during the coming year, we have
log LR(log t - log t,
)
log SIF2 = j^^-2 ^ ^^5 2^^1






= 1.39399 SIF2 = 24.77.
The same result (SIF^ = 24.77) would have been obtained
if SIF-j of 30 at t, of 8 million man-hours had been used. Is
this a good learning rate, or is improvement too slow? Any
improvement is in the right direction. Studies generally
agree that there is no universal curve that fits all learning.
However, the learning curve provides the ability to recognize
the existence or absence of progress and the desirability of
measuring that progress. Improvement is important. When the
learning curve flattens (100 percent) or goes up (greater than
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100 percent) , that plant or group has quit learning (improving)
as already discussed and corrective action is in order.
Sociologists say that learning at the 80 to 90 percent
rate is quite acceptable for a mix of men and machines. So
a very reasonable goal for a safety performance improvement
would be 10 percent per year.
A plot can be prepared to show this goal by using log-log
graph paper and plotting SIF on the vertical ordinate and man-
hours exposure along the horizontal. As time progresses, the
actual values of SIF can be plotted to show their relation to
the goal line. Due to the wide variations in monthly SIF
values, the plotted points may not show any particular relation-
ship to the goal line.
Thus the important aspect of this method is that it allows
management to set goals for coming periods. But once again
it does not account for the magnitude and duration of the
effect created by a change in the safety program and v/e must
wait until accidents occur before there can be a comparison
to determine the effect a change has made in the safety program
[Duty, 1970].
E. SAFETY SAMPLING
Another technique for the evaluation of safety performance
is the safety sampling technique which according to Petersen
(1971) is a method of systematically observing workers to
determine what kind of unsafe acts are being involved as well
as the frequency of occurrence of unsafe conditions. Using
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those results we may come up with a safety performance
figure.
There are some similarities between safety sampling and the
critical incident technique. Duty (1970) has pointed out that
safety sampling is similar to critical incident recall in that
unsafe acts or conditions that might cause accidents are of
interest. The difference is that this sampling is not directly
coupled to the workers own initiative to report these conditions.
Once the number of exposures is estimated through the sampling
procedure, then is compared to previous figures and the number
of exposures is studied. Fewer exposures means more effective
safety program.
Gilmore (1970) presents the following examples concerning
the use of safety sampling technique. Du Pont safety control
program was examined. The number of unsafe acts and unsafe
conditions found in a random selected sample of a work area,
indicates a specific measure of the safety level in that area.
This sample was made in each work area on a once-per-week
schedule by a team of supervisors. The inspections were limited
to 15 minutes. Inspection's time and team were randomly selected,
Then a plot of the inspection results was performed to help in
the interpretations. To ensure uniformity and competence of
the samples, a training program for the supervisors had been
established. The results were encouraging. It was found that
an improvement in safety had occurred. This was a successful
approach, in its primary purpose, of estimating the value of
the safety level of individual sections as well as teams of
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employees, within their sections and plants. The randomness
of the inspection time had a positive effect since the plant
was on a constant alert basis. Other companies such as
Monsanto Company, Chrysler Corporation etc., have used this
technique successfully. One procedure for safety sampling
according to Petersen (1970) is:
1. Preparation of a Code: This is an element code list
of unsafe practices that is developed from the accident record
of each plant. Additional possible causes are listed. This
code is placed on an observation form (see figure 5)
.
2. Sampling: The inspector will identify the department
and the responsible supervisor. He then observes every employee,
every activity of that area and records a safe or unsafe obser-
vation of the employee. Each employee is observed and is
marked as safe or as unsafe if observed as performing safely
or unsafely. Any unsafe practice is marked on the element code
list. The accuracy required as well as the results of a pre-
liminary survey will establish the number of observations
within the sample.
3. Validation of the sample: From the preliminary survey
suppose:
P = The percentage of unsafe observations
Y = Desired accuracy.
























































(2) Carrying heavy load
n Incorrect gripping
(!i) Lifting w/o protective wear 1
(5) aeachlng to lift
(6) Lirtlnp; and turninn
(7) Lifting and bending
(3J Improper grinding
9) Improper pouring
10 Swinging tool toward body
11 Improper eye protection
12 Improper foot wear
13 Loo3e clothing—moTing parts
ill No hair net or cap
15 Wearing rings
i6 Pingers/hands under dies
17' Operating equip, at unsafe speeds
"TF Foot pedal -jnguarded
19 Failure to use guard
20 juard adjusted improperly
21 Climbing on machines
22 Reaching into machine
23) Standing in front of machine
2ti Leaning on running machines
25 Not using push stick (Jigs)
26 Failure to use hand tools
27 Walking 'onder load
2d Leaning--3USDended load
29 Improper use of compressed air
30 Carrying by lead wires
31 Table too crowded
32 Hands and fingers between metal boxes
V Underground power tools
}h Grinding on tool rest
IS Careless Alum, splash
3<. One bracket in sha/t piling
371 Peet under carts or loads
3B) Pushing carts improperly |
,''' Pulling carts improperly
1*0 Hands or feet outside lift truck
M Loose material under foot
V^
Improper piling of material
k^ (Jnsafe loading of trucks
Mt Unaa-fa loading 01 skids
il? Unsai'e loading of racks
(1*6 IMsafe loading of conreyors 1
(U7 Using defective equlpaont ! I I
1
ko Using defectlTB tools 1 [
k9 Eridence oC horseplay 1 1
1 1
50 Runnink in area I J___i ^
Si Repair Boving machines 1














Date- . Time. . Sampler
.
Figure 5: Safety Sampling Worksheet
(Taken from Petersen, D. [1971] , pg. 76)
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We may obtain the minimum number of observations (N) required
for the validity of our results.
This method, as well as the others discussed so far does
not account for the magnitude or the duration of the effect
created by the safety program [Duty, 197 0]
.
F. DOUBLE AVERAGE COMPARISON TECHNIQUE
Another method of measuring safety performance is the
Double Average Comparison Technique method (DACOM) initially
developed by Wilson (1970) of Sperry Flight systems to measure
safety performance.
This method as briefly described below is based upon collec-
tion of number of exposures to potential accidents in various
departments (or areas) of a company and compared with the num-
ber of man-hours worked during a certain period of time.
An achievement index is constructed based on reduction in
number of exposures to potential accidents per million man-
hours worked which gives an indication to the safety director
if there is any improvement or not in various departments (or
areas)
.
An interesting aspect of this method is that it may be
utilized either with data collected by critical incident
technique (or sampling method) or by the use of real accident
data thus permitting management to compare departments in some
uniform way and to have an indication of the effectiveness of
a safety program before occurrence of accidents.
There is no indication whether this method may be econo-
mically utilized. The assumptions that should hold for the
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method to be valid are:
1. A safety program exists,
2. This program had not changed over the period that
this method is applied.
The following procedure is suggested by Duty (1970) for
utilization of the DACOM method;
1. Collection of data for number of exposures to poten-
tial accidents in various locations of the company, using
either the critical incident technique or better, by the
safety sampling method.
2. According to the methodology described in the sampling
technique section a code is prepared, sampling is conducted
and calculation of the required number (N) of observations is
determined.
3. The data of man hours worked in each area during each
time period is obtained.
4. Achievement Index (AI) is defined as the reduction in
number of exposures to potential accidents per million man-
hours worked. This index is calculated for each period worked
and is based upon short range improvement (SRI) and long
range improvement (LRI) . Assuming that the number of exposures
to unsafe acts or conditions is a random variable normally
distributed (for large number of exposures where the Central
Limit Theorem holds)
.
5. The achievement index is then calculated for each
group or area where data were collected.
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A comparison between individual groups or between areas
is feasible based on these achievement indices. This calcula-
tion of the (AI) is accomplished by AI = a (SRI). + b(LRI).
where AI is the Achievement Index for the i period with a
and b the weighting constants based on the subjective management
feeling for the importance of the Short and Long Range Improve-
ments and a+b=l (a=b=.5isan indication that the same
importance is given to the short as well as to the long range
improvements)
.
6. Calculations of the SRI and LRI necessary for the
calculation of the AI is done by:
X. - y
.





(SRI) • = Short range improvement of the group of
workers for the i"^^ period.
X- = Current performance for the i period
which is the number of exposures per
million man-hours worked.
y . = Historical mean performance of the group
through the i"^^ period, and
a. = Standard deviation of the group through
the i"*^^ period.
For i = 1 that is the first period after the new program
was initiated, the current performance (X.) will equal the









(LRI) (Ui - G)/a^^
(LRI) Long Range Improvement for the larger
group for the i"^^ group.
= mean performance of the smaller group and
= the unbiased estimator of the standard
deviation for the larger group.
= The group mean of the larger group,
G, G are based on the total number of exposures
y to unsafe acts or conditions observed






= Current performance for the i period
which is the number of exposures per




N = number of periods, and
"
^,2
a = / ^ (G^ - G) /N-1
^i /i=l
7. Interpretation and utilization of the Achievement
Index as follows
:
The smaller the achievement index the better, as a
small number is indicative of a small number of exposures
experienced by the group for which the AI was calculated.
A negative AI is an indication that the group for which that
AI was calculated did not exceed its mean, whereas the rest
of the company experienced some exposures.
A regression line also may be formed to fit the AI of
the previous years and the current one having the form:
where
y = a + bx
y = The predicted value of achievement based on
the data used,
X = The period number,
a = The intercept of the regression line = y - bx,




I (x. - X) (y . - y)
i=l ^ ^






X. = The i period number,
X = Mean of all periods,
y. = Achievement index for the i period, and
y = The mean achievement index for the overall
periods
.
Positive slope or more positive than the previous period
can be interpreted as a rising tendency to more exposures.
Negative slope or more negative might indicate a falling
tendency.
G. SYSTE^^S ANALYSIS
In their article "The Economics of Safety ... A Review
of the Literature and Perspective", I.R. Canada and M.A.
Ayoub (1977) adopt the definition and description of systems
analysis as given by E.G. Triner (1968) as follows:
Systems analysis is an inquiry to aid a
decision maker to choose a course of action
by systematically investigating his proper
objectives; comparing quantitatively, where
possible, the cost, effectiveness and risks
associated with the alternative policies or
strategies for achieving them, and formulating
additional alternatives if those examined are
found wanting.
Systems analysis is not only the comparison of alternative
means of achieving a desired result but, more importantly,
it is the vehicle for focusing attention upon the basic
requirement itself. The means are complicated and are made
up of a number of interrelated items. In systems analysis,
the analysts, by varying the inputs, can assess the effects
55

upon both costs and output. Given a certain resource, the
best combination of inputs may be determined to maximize
output. Or, from a different point of view ... given the
desired output, it can be determined how this output may be
obtained at a minimum cost.
Safety analysts recognizing the needs for quantification
developed several cost and performance models for analyzing
the economics of safety problems. Roland (1975) has suggested
a measure of safety performance which incorporates in a
single parameter the essentials of that performance, that is
the probability of the mishap and its severity. According
to Roland (1975) when one first attempts to establish a deci-
sion methodology for safety analysis, the multidimensional
nature of the criteria is immediately apparent. The tradi-
tional criterion of quantity of mishaps quickly breaks down
when exposure variation is considered. Combining exposure
with quantity of mishaps results in a rate. This rate is
based on historical evidence and the extrapolation of this
rate to future periods of time as a measure of satisfactory
performance, can be accepted only under two limitations:
1. That the historical performance was typical or aver-
age.
2. That the system which generated the historical rate
will not be substantially altered in the future period.
The matter of the level of historical performance may be
satisfactorily resolved if there are multiple samples of
the rate exhibiting stability.
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For the variability of historical rate a suitable function
of the chi-square distribution of the form
X <_ -^; 2F + 2
where
;
A = mishap rate
a = risk
F = number of mishaps (historical)
T = historical exposure,
is suggested by Roland (1975)
.
This function of the chi-square distribution will establish
a conservative bound for a future criterion. Also this func-
tion assumes that the mishap rate varies as the chi-square
distribution. Such a rate, usually single bounded, projected
into future periods, can provide a measure of future perform-
ance given that no substantive alterations are made in the
system.
Assuming an estimate of future exposure, the Binomial or
Poisson distributions will determine the probability of future







k = number of mishaps
t = future system exposure
The problem which arises from another dimension of the
performance analysis, the severity of the mishap, given the
probability of a future mishap and its value, the expected
value may be formed as
00
E(C)K = / Pr(K)C(K)
— oo
where C = Cost
Certain probability functions will not allow this integral to
be convergent. Such a case may be extremely costly for the
user of such a system. Expected costs can be predicted in
these cases by taking average values. It is frequently
easier to perform a summation than to integrate the functions
Such a summation is given by
K
E(C)K = I Pr(n)C(n)
n=l
As another method of measuring safety effectiveness may
be considered the m.ethod used by Brown (197 6) who developed
a Fault tree and cost/benefit analysis for choosing optimal
58

safety alternatives. J.R. Canada and M.A. Ayoub (1977)
summarize Brown's work as follows.
Brown shows how negative utility amounts can be assigned
to all possible head events and the relevant probabilities
multiplied by the negative utilities. The results, which
are expected negative utility amounts, are called "measures
of criticality" by Brown (1976).
Reductions in negative expected utility or criticality
are considered to be quantitative expressions of benefits or
effectiveness, and these are then related to costs to find the
optimal combination of safety alternatives for the decision
maker's cost-benefit trade-off function.
Using Brown's (1976) methodology the safety manager should
first utilize the fault-tree analysis technique as a logical
approach to identify the areas in a system that are most criti-
cal to safe operation.
Having developed the fault tree analysis the safety manager
has an insight of the problem but for further quantification
a quantitative analysis has to be accomplished so that effec-
tively allocated the safety budget which is an upper bound
for the actual decision to be taken.
Generally the best investments are those with the lowest
cost/benefit figures, and these should be made first. Those
figures may be interpreted as safety performance figures and
when viewed in this perspective it becomes a powerful tool for




Next the fault tree methodology will be examined since
it is the basis for discussing Brown's approach to cost/benefit
analysis. Following this discussion an application on cost/
benefit analysis using fault tree analysis will be performed.
1. Fault Tree Analysis
Fault Tree Analysis, (FTA) , was developed mainly by
engineers who studied engineering systems in great detail,
with little or no contribution by mathematicians. A possible
explanation given by R.E. Barlow (1975); J.B. Fussell (1975)
and N.D. Singpurwalla (1975) is the fact that the construction
of the fault tree, a basic step in fault tree analysis, requires
an intimate knowledge of the manner in which a system is de-
signed and operated. The mathematician's lack of familiarity
with the operation of systems, and perhaps their preoccupation
with mathematically well defined problems, has deterred their
interest in fault tree analysis.
According to R.E. Barlow (1975) and H.E. Lambert (1975)
,
FTA is one of the principle methods of systems safety analysis.
FTA evolved in the aerospace industry in the early 1960 's. It
was the result of a contract between the Air Force Ballistics
systems division and Bell Telephone Laboratories for the study
of inadvertant launch in the Minuteman ICBM [Delong, 1970] .
After initial work at Bell Telephone Laboratories, development
of fault tree continued at the Boeing Company, where scien-
tists devoted much effort to develop its procedures further
and became its foremost proponents.
Rodgers (1971) has referred to the following six




1. Define the undesired event
2. Acquire complete understanding of the system. .
3. Construct the logic diagram (Fault tree)
4. Collect quantitative data
5. Evaluate fault tree probability
6. Analyze computer results.
FTA is a detailed deductive analysis that usually requires
considerable system information. It can be a valuable design
tool. It can identify potential accidents in a system design
and can help eliminate costly design changes and retrofits.
FTA can also be a diagnostic tool. It can predict the most
likely causes of system failure in the event of a system
breakdown.
Undesired events requiring FTA are identified either
by inductive analysis, such as a preliminary hazard analysis,
or by intuition. These events are usually undesired system
states that can occur as a result of subsystem functional
faults. These events can be broad, all-encompassing events,
such as "Release of Radioactivity from a Nuclear Power Plant"
or "Inadvertent Launch of an ICBM Missile", or they can be
specific events, such as "Failure to Insert Control Rods"
or "Energizing Power Available on Ordnance Ignition Line".
The goal of fault tree construction is to model the
system conditions that can result in the undesired event.
Before the construction of a fault tree can proceed, the
analyst must acquire a thorough understanding of the system.
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In fact, a system description should be part of the analysis
documentation. The analyst must carefully define the undesired
event under consideration, called the 'Top or Head event'.
Practical considerations require that he scope the
analysis, setting partial and temporal bounds on the system.
To make his analysis understandable to others, the analyst
should clearly show all the assumptions made in the construc-
tion of the fault tree and the system description used.
Event Description : A fault tree is a model that
graphically and logically represents the various combinations
of possible events, both fault and normal, occurring in a
system that leads to the top event. The term, event, denotes
a dynamic change of state that occurs to a system element.
System elements include hardware, software, human and environ-
mental factors.
Event Symbols : The symbols shown in figure 6 represent
specific types of fault and normal events in FTA. The rectangle
defines an event that is the output of a logic gate and is
dependent on the type of logic gate and the inputs to the
gate.
The circle defines a basic inherent failure of a system
element when operated within its design specifications. It
is therefore a primary failure, and is also referred to as a
genetic failure. The diamond represents a failure other than
a primary failure that is purposely not developed further.
The switch event represents an event that is expected to occur
or to never occur because of design and normal conditions,
such as a phase change in a system.
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Fault Event Basic Event
Undeveloped Event Switch Event
Transfer IN Transfer OUT Conditional Input
Figure 6: Event Symbols
(Taken from Brown, D.B. [1976], pg. 158
and Rodgers, W.P. [1971], pg. 41)
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Logic Gates : The fundamental logic gates for fault
tree construction are the OR and the AND gates. The OR gate
describes a situation where the output event will exist if •
one or more of the input events exist.
The AND gate describes the logical operation that
requires the coexistence of all input events to produce the
output event. Another gate used in the FTA is the inhibit
gate. This gate permits applying a condition or restriction
to the sequence. The input and condition or restriction must
be satisfied for an output to be generated. The symbols for
the logic gates are shown in figure 7.
Construction Methodology : The fault tree is so struc-
tured that the sequences of events that lead to the undesired
event are shown below the top event and are logically related
to the undesired event by logical gates. The input events to
each logic gate that are also outputs of other logic gates at
a lower level are shown as rectangles. These events are
developed further until the sequences of events lead to basic
causes of interest, called "basic events". The basic events
appear as circles and diamonds on the bottom of the fault tree
and represent the limit of resolution of the fault tree.
The structuring process used to develop fault flows
in fault trees when a system is examined on a functional
basis is presented in figure 8. At this level, schematics,
piping diagrams, processes flow sheets, etc., are examined for









Figure 7: Symbols For Logic Gates










The output of an AND gate occurs
only if all the inputs exist.
The output of an OR gate occurs if any of the
inputs exist.
'Out-of-tolerance failure of a system element —
failure due to excessive operational or environmental
stress.
j
An innibit gate is a special case of the























Figure 8: Levels Of Fault Tree Development
(Taken from Barlow, R.E. and Lambert, H.E. [1975], pg. 16)
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subsystem and component fault states that can contribute to
the occurrence of the undesired event.
Efforts have been directed toward automating fault
tree construction for computer implementation [Fussell, 1972];
[Powers et al, 1975]
.
Purpose and Evaluation of the Fault Tree ; The fault
tree once constructed, serves as an aid in determining the
possible causes of an accident. When properly used, the
fault tree often leads to discovery of failure combinations
which otherwise might not have been recognized as causes of
the event under analysis. The fault tree can be used as a
visual tool in communicating and supporting decisions based
on the analysis, such as determining the adequacy of system
design. The fault tree provides a convenient and efficient
format helpful for either quantitative or qualitative evalua-
tion of an event, such as determination of the probability of
the occurrence of a top event.
In the fault tree and Cost/Benefit analysis as the
major goal of the fault tree may be considered as the calcula-
tion of the probability of occurrence of the top event.
In many cases the construction of an initial fault
tree may be reduced to a simplified one. There are basically
two techniques for simplification of the boolean expression
of a fault tree. That is either utilizing the Veitch diagrams
or analytically utilizing the Boolean algebra identities.
Appendix (A) gives these identities the familiarity of which
increase the ability of manipulating Boolean equations.
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According to Brown (1976) the purpose of developing
a fault tree and quantifying it it to effectively allocate
the safety budget. To do this, the various alternative safety
investments are considered in light of their effect upon the
fault tree and the resulting head event. A measure of cost/
benefit is then determined for use in decision making. Before
completing the presentation of Brown's methodology some
terminology as given by Brown (1976) will be introduced.
Cost . Cost is defined as the dollar outlay to pay for
the incorporation of a device, method, procedure and so on
(henceforth called a countermeasure) into the industrial sys-
tem for a given unit period of exposure. Thus the cost of
devices that must be periodically recharged and/or replaced
is based on average costs for a given unit (e.g., a 1,000,000
man-hour exposure period). Permanent fixtures, such as machine
guards, can be prorated on the basis of the life of the machine
The cost of educational programs can be prorated, based upon
their frequency. All countermeasures must, for comparison
pruposes, have a common denominator.
Benefit . Benefit is the negative utility reduction.
Measure of benefit is the expected negative utility. There is
a negative utility (or cost in terms of dollars and personal
well-being) associated with accidents. This negative utility
depends upon the severity of the accident.
The expected negative utility of the head event if
it occurs can now be calculated by the following:
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nE = y p.u.
where
:
P^. = the probability of occurrence of the i
severity class given that the head event
occurs,
1
N = the number of severity classes.
u. = the negative utility associated with the
ith severity class.
An alternative method for calculating E would be more
appropriate if the values of negative utility from a large
number of past occurrences of the head event were measured
directly. Thus the expected negative utility associated with





Both equations are equivalent under the conditions
that there are n severity classes (N = n) and that the proba-
bility of each severity class is equivalent (P. =
„
^ * This
occurs when each accident is considered as a unique situation
Cost/Benefit : This term is a vague term used in
describing a variety of applications. Here it is defined to
be the dollars spent per negative utility reduction.
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Absolute measure of "Criticality" : Associated with
the head event is defined as
C = P . E
where
:
P = The head event probability of occurrence
(in occurrence/mmh) . (The technique for
obtaining P will be discussed.)
E = The expected negative utility (in dollars/
occurrence or workday/occurrence etc.). Thus
the absolute criticality associated with
the head event it takes into consideration
both the frequency and the severity.
Determination of head-event Probabilities ; The value
of P can be obtained assuming that a proper unit of time or
production has been determined to adequately define one trial
Following directly the concepts of relative frequency and





n, = the number of occurrences of the head event
is n trials given by the chosen time or
production time.
Another way of determining P is by using the fault
tree end branch probabilities. This is necessary if the effect
of alternative countermeasures is to be determined.
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The probabilities of the branch events may be obtained
as follows:
In the OR situation, any of the events will cause the
subsequent event to occur and, therefore, assuming indepen-
dence, the probability of occurrence of the subsequent event
is given by
n




q. = the probability of the i causal event, and
n = the number of parallel branches.
In the AND situation, all the events must occur for
the subsequent event to occur and, therefore, assuming inde-
pendence, the probability of occurrence of the subsequent
event is given by
n
^A = " ^i^ i=l ^
Through a reiterative process the probability of the
head event can be determined from a knowledge of the proba-
bilities of the branch events. This is the value of P that
is used in determing the "criticality" associated with the
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head event (or absolute expected negative utility) . A system
modification will produce a change in this value of the
expected negative utility thus providing a measure of benefit
which actually is a measure of safety performance.
Brown (197 6) gives various examples to demonstrate the
entire procedure. Here an example will be presented as a
problem that has been formulated by Brown (1976) in his book
Systems Analysis and Design for Safety . For the solution of
this problem, Brown's methodology was followed as already
described.
2 . Example
It is desired to perform a cost/benefit analysis uti-
lizing fault-tree analysis. The analysis will be perform.ed
on a stairway where the following accident data are assumed
to be known, for a five years period. Slippery surfaces
caused three accidents, inadequate railings caused five acci-
dents, inattention caused two accidents, and obstacles on the
steps caused one accident. If the negative utility for each
accident was an average cost of 200 dollars and if 1000 dollars
are to be spent for improving the safety of the stairway
according to the following alternatives, each costs 500 dollars
Alternative one . Install new surfaces, this will
reduce the accidents caused by slippery surfaces by 70%.
Alternative two . Install new railings, this will
reduce the accidents caused by inadeuate railings by 50%.
Alternative three . Install warning signs and perform
educational programs, by this alternative a reduction of
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20% to the obstacle and railing-related accidents is
expected.
Then perform the following:
a. Construct a fault tree diagram for this example.
b. Based on an evaluation of the alternatives the
best allocation of the 1000 dollars should be determined.
c. It is to be determined whether an alternative
investment of 50 dollars in another area that would yield
a cost/benefit of 50.00 be justified? (A 60-month denominator
in calculating basic event probabilities will be used.)
3 . Fault Tree Diagram Construction
For the construction of the fault tree diagram the
following basic events are required.
B. Person enters stairway with care
C. Slippery surfaces of stair
D. Inadequate railings
E. Obstacles on steps
F. Person enters stairway with no care (This basic
event is the complement of B.)
From those basic events (or combinations), the head event
accident on stairway CA) is likely to occur as follows:
Event B AND event C have caused 3 accidents in the
past five years.
Event B AND event D have caused 5 accidents in the
past five years.




Event F has caused 2 accidents in the past five
years.
Thus events B AND C; OR events B AND D; OR events B
AND E; OR event F is likely to produce the head event A. That
is a stairway accident.
Figure 9 is the fault tree diagram that represents
the above situations.
4 . Basic Event Probabilities Calculations
A 60-month denominator will be used in calculating
basic event probabilities since it is given so.
Event C
3
P = TT-r- = 0.05 Accidents/months
c 60
Event D
Pj = ^ryr = 0.083 Accidents/monthsd oO
Event E





. = -±- = 0.033 Accidents/months
r 60




























Figure 9: Example Fault Tree With Probabilities Assigned
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EVALUATION OF THE HEAD PROBABILITY OF THE EVENT A
Using
n
Pq = 1 - n (1-q.)
i=l




for the AND gates we get
P = 1- (1 - 0.05) (1 - 0.083) (1 - 0.0166) (1 - 0.033)
= 1 - (0.95) (0.917) (0.983) (0.067) = 1 - 0.828
= 0.1719 having an accident/months.
EVALUATION OF THE EXPECTED COST
Since it is given that the negative utility for each
accident is $200/Accident the expected cost is given by
E(C) = 200(3) + 200(5) + 200(1) + 200(2)
= $2,200
EVALUATION OF THE ORIGINAL CRITICALITY
C = E(c) P, or
C = (2,200) (0.1719) = 378.18
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EVALUATION OF THE NEW CRITICALITY FOR ALTERNATIVES
ALTERNATIVE (1)
New surfaces which will reduce accidents caused by
slippery surfaces by 70%. That is P reduces to
^Cd) = ^c =^ 1^ = °-°5 ^ 1^ = °-°^^
New head probability with alternative (1) is
P,^. =1- (1 - 0.015) (1 - 0.083) (1 - 0.0166) (1 - 0.033)
= 1 - 0.985x0.917x0.983x0.967
= 1 - 0.858 = 0.1414
New Criticality with alternative (1) is
C.,. = 2,200 X 0.1414 = 311.08
ALTERNATIVE (2)
New railings will reduce accidents caused by inadequate
•ailings by 50%. That is with alternative (2) P reduces to
^D(2) = ^D ^ !^ = °-°23 X i = 0.0415
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New head probability with alternative (2) is
P.2V =1- (1 - 0.05) (1 - 0.0415) (1 - 0.0166) (1 - 0.033)
= 1- (0.95) (0.958) (0.983) (0.967)
= 0.134
New Criticality with alternative (2) is
C^ = 2200 X 0.134 = 294.8
ALTERNATIVE (3)
Signs and educational programs which are estimated to
reduce railing-related accidents and obstacle related accidents
both by 20%. That is with alternative (3) both P-j and P are
reduced to
^DO) = ^D '^ 1^ = °-°" X i = 0.066
^E(3) = ^E ^ W = °-°"« =^ I = °-°"
The new head probability with alternative (3) is
P,3. =1- (1 - 0.05) (1 - 0.066) (1 - 0.013) (1 - 0.033)
= 1 - 0.95 X 0.934 X 0.987 x 0.967 = 0.153

The new criticality is
C-^> = 2200 X 0.153 = 336.6.
5. Summary of Alternatives
ALTERNA- ORIGINAL NEW BENEFIT COST/
TIVE COST CRITICALITY CRITICALITY (savings) BENEFIT
1 $500 378.18 311.08 67.1 7.45
2 $500 378.18 294.8 83.38 5.99
3 $500 378.18 336.6 41.58 12.02
Since the constraint of the safety budget is $1000
safety performance will better increase by choosing alternatives
2 (which is best in terms of cost/benefit) and 1 (second in
terms of cost/benefit)
.
To answer the question "Would an alternative invest-
ment of $500 in another area that would yield a cost/benefit
of 50.00 be justified?", may be answered as follows:
^°st
= 50 since Cost = 500Benefit
a benefit of
-ttt- = 10 should be found.
Since ORIGINAL CRITICALITY - NEW CRITICALITY = BENEFIT, then
37 8.18 - NEW CRITICALITY =10 and NEW CRITICALITY = 378.18 - 10
= 368.18 which may be achieved by varying one of the branch









III. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
Already a variety of methods for evaluating safety perform-
ance have been discussed covering most of the existing tech-
niques in use today.
From the above discussion it is apparent that this is an
open area for research and development of new methodologies
that will permit major improvement in overall safety systems.
To support this some general area problems will be presented
and limitations of the methods that already have been dis-
cussed will be considered.
The first main problem is that today there is not in
existence either a unique methodology concerning safety
evaluation or a unique measurement. That is, various methods
exist and each one uses a different unit of measure. Some
methods concentrate on rates, frequency or severity, others
on indices, and others on cost or cost/benefit units.
Second, problems concerning most methods in use, is a
lack of accepted minimum level of requirements. These require-
ments are varying depending on management policy, existing
regulations, budget constraints, and controllable variables
of the working environment.
Following is a brief overview of the literature survey
methods discussed. The purpose is one of considering existing
problems and limitations of these m.ethodologies since those
problems and limitations support the idea of the existing
problem of safety performance measurement.

A. FREQUENCY AND SEVERITY RATES
The primary objective of this technique is to measure the
injury experience of a corporation or its departments. Also
we want to establish comparison criteria between departments
or corporations for certain periods of time.
This comparison between companies creates a problem since
most of the companies do not want to lose their reputation
and biased data could influence results. In appraising safety
performance, several-year periods are required so that the
behavior of the safety program is better traced. The evalua-
tion of those rates is based on accident statistics after the
accidents have occurred, thus we are not able to predict the
influence that a safety improvement might have on the safety
performance. Finally those rates do not give any cost or
lost-time indications. Thus these rates should not be used
exclusively as the only means of evaluating safety performance,
B. CRITICAL INCIDENT TECHNIQUE
The main objective of this technique is to identify the
effectiveness through personal involvement. That is its
effectiveness is biased by the personal willingness to report
a hazardous situation. Also it does not provide what the
criteria are for measuring safety performance. Again we can
not predict based on this technique for the am.ount of future
improvement. For these reasons we may not adopt this as a




Plotting on a chart frequency of accidents (number of
accidents per million man hours or accident rates) vs. time
to show comparisons between various departments or to give an
Dverall picture of the safety program and to visually indicate
Dut of control situations is the primary objective of this
nethod. Again since we are plotting frequency rate the same
cestrictions that were examined for the frequency and severity
trates hold here. Thus control charts should not be considered
as the only accepted means for evaluating safety performance
Dut rather might be used as indicators for presenting statisti-
cal data in graphical form.
D. LEARNING CURVE
A different approach to the problem of quantifying safety
performance was presented by utilizing the information pro-
/ided by the learning curve due to learning experience. Again
lere we can not rely on the learning effect for predicting
future expectations of injury frequency at some future time
since there are other factors that influence the positive
Improvements due to learning effect. That is, overestimating
Dur ability or careless behavior should not be ignored. Also
a change in the safety program can not be predicted by the
Learning curve.
E. SAFETY SAiMPLING
This method may be considered as an improvement of the
::ritical incident technique. That is it eliminates the bias
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introduced by the workers and can be used as an excellent
indicator concerning supervisory performance and motivation.
Some problems that can be seen are the following:
In utilizing this method the most important act is that
"of systematically observing workers in order to determine
what unsafe acts are being committed and how often they are
occurring" . But the workers become more attentive when they
realize that their unsafe acts are recorded.
Another problem is that this method does not account for
the magnitude or duration created by improvements in the
safety program.
P. DOUBLE AVERAGE COMPARISON TECHNIQUE
This method for measuring the effectiveness of a safety
program has not been widely adopted. The following reasons
night give some explanation. For collecting necessary data
it is required to apply either the critical incident technique
Dr the safety sampling methods. Thus, the problems already
in existence with the utilization of these methods are intro-
iuced. The Achievement Index which is a function of the Short
and Long range improvements depends on weighing constants that
reflect "managements feelings as to the importance of Short
and Long range improvements". This introduces a bias into
the evaluation of the Achievement Index since it is the sub-
jective feeling of management.
Finally it has been pointed out that strong assumptions
should hold for correct implementation of this method. That
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iS/ during the period of data collection (suppose a 3 or 4
years period) no change in the safety program has occurred.
G. SYSTEMS ANALYSIS METHODS
A wide range of approaches and techniques for analyzing
the economics of the safety problems have been developed
such as the systems analysis approach, fault tree and cost/
benefit analysis approach, mathematical modeling approaches,
etc. Those methods are using the concepts of utility or
certain monetary equivalence (cost, losses, cost/benefit,
etc.) as criteria for measuring safety performance effective-
ness.
Since it was found that the most commonly used approach
was the fault tree cost/benefit analysis approach, more
emphasis has been given and an extensive presentation of
its methodology has been provided. In this chapter some
problem areas will be considered.
In many instances large amounts of time are required to
understand the process, identify hazards, create the necessary
fault trees and even then oversight and omission problems may
arise. Since fault tree analysis (FTA) can be complex and
time consuming, in many cases computers should be used to
gather information, and construct and deduce the fault tree.
However, again there are no clear cut programs to fit any
specific case - thus the need for development of new programs
might be necessary. Another problem in fault tree modeling
is that it is difficult to apply Boolean logic to describe
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failures of system components that can be partially success-
ful in operation (i.e., a transmission system that might
function, but not at a 100% level or leakage through a valve
are two examples) and thereby have effects on the performance
of the system. Another problem area is, that to apply the
cost/benefit analysis quantitative evaluation of the fault
tree is required. As a consequence in many cases we are faced
with the problem to apply probabilities to the "man" since
human failure or error cases is very difficult to be predicted
and probabilities assigned.
As a last remark it should be pointed out that fault tree/
cost-benefit analysis does not seem to be a proper methodology
for evaluation of the overall performance of an organization
but it is suggested for use in evaluating the effectiveness
of specific areas, and particularly where there is an indica-
tion of potential hazard.
The review of various methodologies for measuring safety
performance has indicated that further improvements in this
area might be attained if additional effort was focused on
cost related measures that will account not only for the
effectiveness of existing safety programs but also for the
effectiveness of those programs that continuously are modified
to meet future requirements based on passed experience. The
next chapter will concentrate on measuring occupational
safety performance based on the above concept.
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IV. AN APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM OF MEASURING SAFETY PERFORMANCE
Before trying to approach the problem of measuring safety
performance two questions should be answered. These are:
a. Why measure safety performance? And
b. If measuring safety performance is a requirement,
then what should be the measurement criterion?
It is not so difficult to answer the first question. There
are many reasons dictating that measuring safety performance
is a must. Measurement of safety performance provides a
tool by which to judge its contribution in achieving the
overall goals of an organization. Based on these measurements
future predictions can be made. These measurements contribute
mainly to control the current situation and predict the
future.
The second question may be answered by choosing among the
various criteria that already exist such as the "frequency
criterion" or "severity" or "cost" or "lost man hours", etc.
The most appropriate criterion chosen here is the "cost cri-
terion". The reasons for choosing this criterion are the
following:
a. It is an easily understandable concept by management.
b. It is appropriate in making comparisons among alterna-
tives .
c. It is an immediate indicator of the effective
allocation of the safety budget.
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d. Hidden costs become apparent and it becomes easier
to trace whether we are moving within the bounds of the
budgetary constraints.
e. The safety function as a positive contributor to
Dverall organizational efficacy will be more appreciated.
After the criterion for measuring safety performance has
Deen established an approach to the problem of measuring
safety performance is possible.
This approach can be based upon seven main steps. These
steps can be patterned after OSHA requirements and are as
follows
:
a. Preparation of the accident records according to
Dccupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) requirements.
b. Coding of these data according to organizational
structure to create an appropriate computer file.
c. Determination of the total (overall) safety related
:ost. This is a current measure of safety performance.
d. Determination of the average cost for each type of
accident/incident
.
e. Data analysis to develop a safety model. Based on
bhis model future accident predictions can be made, provided
that no significant changes in the safety program have been
accomplished.
f. Computation of an expected total cost figure.
g. Cost/benefit analysis study of hazardous areas to
identify alternatives to reduce the expected cost.

A detailed analysis to accomplish the above steps is given
below.
Step (a). Preparation of the accident records . Prepara-
tion of the accident records is a very significant step since
the overall approach is initially based on this recordable
information.
The following records are required to be maintained by
each employer with over seven employees according to OSHA.
a. Log of occupational injuries and illnesses OSHA form
100 or lOOF modified (see figure 10).
b. Supplementary record of occupational injuries and
illnesses, OSHA form 101 (see figure 11).
c. Summary-occupational injuries and illnesses, OSHA
form 102 (see figure 12) .
According to Showalter (1976) the log of recordable injuries
and illness (form 100) should maintain all recordable occupa-
tional injuries and illnesses for that establishment. Each
recordable occupational injury and illness should be entered
into the log not later than 6 working days after the informa-
tion about a recordable case has occurred.
Since this record is sufficient to provide all necessary
information concerning the present methodology instructions
for completing each column of this form, according to OSHA,
are discussed below.
Column 1 . Column 1 refers to Case or file number. Any
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Ca» or File No
Form approved
OM8 No- 44R 1453
Supplementary Record of Occupational Injuries and Illnesses
EMPLOYER
1 Ninw
2. VI«il address -
'No and ilrrell iCil> or lonl < Smr
3. Loririon. i( different frnm mail address
INJLRED OR ILL EMPLOYEE
4. Name Soriai Securilv No.
Mi.ldl*
5. Home address
7. 5ex: Male Female 'C!i»k .6. Age
8. Occupation .,
' Enier r^nular job nilf. int ih« t^rthe «rti»iiT ht -js prrrorminR il •\mr o/ injurr)
9. Department __
' Entpr n»mr nl iJtp«rim*n( nr Hiimioh in whicti ih* iniuivil penoa ia r-gutgrlT etaployni, e»m
th^gnh h^ mar h»fe betn tempottrlr '•orking m inorher lii-ptnowm si ibe 'ime o( in|uiT.»
THE ACCIDENT OR EXPOSLRE TO OCCUPMIONAL ILLNESS
10. Place ot accident or expo«ure
'Nf> indiirrfi) 'Cltj ot tnwnt 'Sinef
If accident or exposure orrurred on employer's premises, give address of plant or establishment in which
it ixrurrcd. Do not Indicate department or division within the plant or establishment. If accident oc-
curred outside -mplover's premises at sn identihablo addrew, give that address. If it occurred on a pub-
lic highway or at anv '^ther place which cannot be idenli6ed by number and street, please provide piace
references localinn the place of iniury as accurately as possible.
U. Wn place of accident -•r exposure '^n employers premises? i Y^ * or Nol
12. What was the employee doing when injured? ,
' B< ii^cific. If he «I9 usJBi 'ooli or rqaipmeni nr handling malfrial.
name 'bem t
13. How did the acrideni occur?
id tril whai h* was dome with ihrm. >
* D^Kribe (ollv the eienta which resulted in th» tojury c
htppeaed tDd bow it happetied Naoe any obtrcti lubtiancrs invnlved and id) bow tbey wet
full dwail* on ail facron -h.<-h I^d or <-an(rib.M«-d lo thf accid'ni I'w -oDavaie ^h^^i 'or addhionai <p«ce t
OCCUPATIONAL INJIRY OR OCCUPATIONAL ILLNESS
14. Describe the ingury or Jlnesa in detail and indicate the part of body affected.
'e.%.: ampuiaiior oi n<hl I . fintP,
tl v^ond jfnoi ; Iraciur^ of not l^d poiwnini ; H«rmaiiii9 ^ f left hand, etc,
)
15 Name the obiect or substance which directly injured the employee iFor ciample. the machine or thin|f
he struck agamsl or which struck htm. (he vapor or poison Se inhaled or *wallow«J: fhe chemical or ra-
diation which irritated his sktn: or in casea of itrains, hernias, etc.. :he thing he was liftini^. pulling, etc.)
16. Date of injury or initial diagnosis of occupational illnesa
17. Did employee die? iY«or Nni
OTHER
18. Name and address of phvsician
!*> If hospitaliied. name and addr-ss af hospital
Dale oi report Prepared by
Official position . • ----
Figure 11; Supplementary Record of Occupational
Injuries and Illnesses, Form OSHA - 101







Occupational Injuries and Illnesses
hm«nl Name md \Hdr«3:
Form Approved
0M8 No iiS 145:


































Occupational Skin DiseaMs or
Disorders














2S i Disorders du« to physical agents
1 'other than roxic maienalsl
.
i
26 Disorders due to repeated trauma
i
i 1












•Nool.n 1 Caw* Withnui Ln** Vorkdcy^
—
C**e^ rriultinf in: MrdiCtt ir^Hmrnt bviond Ar<l iid.
<»• "( i:on»cin«in«*. r^^irirtmn of "ork or nwiiOB, or irjn*(*f fn innihft roll (wnKoul lost »
iaino^iv of irciipaliona
rorhdai-sf
Figure 12: Annual Suiranary of Occupational Injuries
and Illnesses, Form OSHA - 102
(Taken from Petersen, D. [1975] , pg. 21)
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Column 2 . Column 2 refers to date of injury or illness.
For occupational injuries enter the date of the work accident
which resulted in injury. For occupational illnesses enter
the date of initial diagnosis of illness, or, if absence
occurred before diagnosis, the first day of the absence in
connection with which the case was diagnosed.
Column 3 . Column 3 refers to Employee's name. First
name or initial, middle initial, last name.
Column 4 . Column 4 refers to the occupation. Enter the
occupation title of the job to which the employee was
assigned at the time of injury or illness.
In the absence of a formal occupational title, enter a
brief description of the duties of the employee.
Column 5 . Column refers to the department. Enter the
name of the department to which employee was assigned at the
time of injury or illness, whether or not employee was actually
working in that department at the time. In the absence of
normal department titles, enter a brief description of normal
workplace to which employee is assigned.
Column 6 . Column 6 refers to the nature of injury or
illness and part(s) of body affected.
Enter a brief description of the injury or illness and
indicate the part or parts of body affected. Where the entire
body is affected, the entry "body" can be used.
Column 7 . Column 7 refers to the injury or illness code.
Enter the one code which most accurately describes the nature
of injury or illness. A list of codes appears at the bottom
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of the log. A more complete description of occupational
injuries and illnesses appears below in "definitions".
Column 8 . Column 8 refers to fatalities. If the occu-
pational injury or illness resulted in death, enter date of
death.
Column 9A . Column 9A refers to lost workday cases. Enter
a check for each case which involves days away from work, or
days of restricted work, activity, or both. Each lost workday
case also requires an entry in column 9 or column 10, or
both. Column 9A is not shown in figure 10.
Column 9B . Column 9B refers to lost workdays - days away
from work. Enter the number of workdays (consecutive or not)
on which the employee would have worked but could not because
of occupational injury or illness. The number of lost work-
days should not include the day of injury or onset of illness
or any days on which the employee would not have worked even
though able to work. Note: For employees not having a regu-
larly scheduled shift, i.e., certain truck drivers, construc-
tion workers, part-time employees, etc., it may be necessary
to estimate the number of lost workdays. Estimates of lost
workdays shall be based on prior work history of the employee
and days worked by employees, not ill or injured, working in
the department and/or occupation of the ill or injured employee,
Column 10 . Column 10 refers to lost workdays - days of
restricted work activity. Enter the number of workdays
(consecutive or not) on which because of injury or illness:
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1. The employee was assigned to another job on a
temporary basis.
2. The employee worked at a permanent job less than full
time , or
3. The employee worked at a permanently assigned job
but could not perform all duties normally connected with it.
The number of lost work days should not include the day
of injury or onset of illness or any days on which the employee
would not have worked even though able to work.
Column 11 . Column 11 refers to non-fatal cases without
lost workdays. Enter a check in column 11 for all cases of
occupational injury or illness, which did not involve fatali-
ties or lost workdays but did result in transfer to another
job or termination of employment or medical treatment, other
than first aid or diagnosis of occupational illness, or loss
of consciousness.
Column 12 . Column 12 refers to transfer to another job
or termination or employment without lost workdays. If the
check in column 11 represented a transfer to another job or
termination of employment with no lost workdays, enter another
check in column 12.
Some additional instructions for completing this log of
occupational injuries and illnesses with definition of terms
for use in recording occupational injuries and illnesses will
be discussed for completeness of step one.
Initialing requirement . Each line entry regarding an
occupational injury or illness must be initialed in the right
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hand margin by the person responsible for the accuracy of the
entry. Changes in an entry also must be initialed in the
affected column.
Changes in extent of or outcome of injury or illness . If
there is a change in an occupational injury or illness case
which affects entries in columns 9, 10, 11 or 12, the first
entry should be lined out and a new entry made. For example,
if an injured employee at first required only medical treat-
ment but later lost workdays, the check in column 11 should be
lined out and the number of lost workdays entered in column 9.
In another example, if an employee with an occupational ill-
ness lost workdays, returned to work, and then dies of the
illness, the workdays noted in column 9 should be lined out
and the date of death entered in column 8. An entry may be
lined out if later found to be a nonoccupational injury or
illness
.
Definition of terms for use in recording occupational
injuries and illnesses . Definition of terms for use in
recording occupational injuries and illnesses are as follows:
Occupational injury . Occupational injury is any injury
such as a cut, fracture, sprain, amputation, etc., which
results from, a work accident or from exposure in the work
environment.
Occupational illness . Occupational illness of an employee
is any abnormal condition or disorder, other than one resulting
from an occupational injury, caused by exposure to environmental
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factors associated with his employment. It includes acute
and chronic illnesses or diseases which may be caused by
inhalation, absorption, ingestion, or direct contact, and
which can be included in the categories as listed below.
The listing that gives the categories of occupational
illnesses and disorders that v>;ill be utilized for the purpose
of classifying recordable illnesses can be seen in figure 10
under the term "illness codes". The identifying codes are
those to be used in column 7 of the log.
Recordable occupational injuries and illnesses . Recorda-
ble occupational injuries and illnesses are any occupational
injuries or illnesses which result in:
1. Fatalities, regardless of the time between the injury
and death, or the length of the illness; or
2. Lost workdays cases, other than fatalities that result
in lost workdays; or
3. Nonfatal cases without lost workdays, which result in
transfer to another job or termination of employment, or
require medical treatment, or involve loss of consciousness.
This category also includes any diagnosed occupational ill-
nesses which are reported to the Agency but are not classi-
fied as fatalities or lost workday cases.
Step (b) . Coding of the accident data . Coding of the
accident data according to organizational structure is a
requirement for two main reasons that is, of storing the
accident data in a computer for developing a "data bank".
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and to be able to manipulate these data using a computer if
necessary, to develop a safety model.
Coding depends on information required to be stored for
future use. Suppose that the following information is necessary
to be stored concerning each accident.
Year, month, day and day of the week that the accident
occurred. This information may be taken from the accident
log. The day of the week may be represented by one of the
integers 1 to 7 indicating the corresponding days Sunday
through Saturday.
Other information needed to be coded are the occupations
and departments. Two integer numbers with sufficient number
of digits depending on the size of the company may be used
to code this information. That is, if in a company with 80
distinct occupations and 2 departments, two integer two digit
codes are enough. Also the injury or illness code, number of
deaths, lost workdays, and nonfatal cases without lost workdays
as well as the cost of each accident may be coded and included
in the computer file.
The next step is to determine the total safety related
cost of each accident from which the overall safety related
cost for a year will be determined.
In general the approach to this step is to evaluate the
total cost of each accident as the sum of the two costs,
direct and indirect, by following the detailed analysis as
given below. The cost of each accident may be included in
the data file as discussed above. Another cost that will
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be calculated is the average cost for each type of occupa-
tional injury or illness as will be discussed later.
Step (c) . Determination of the total costs . The total
safety related costs of a company are composed of both fixed
and variable costs in the following relationship.
TOTAL COST = FIXED COST + VARIABLE COST
The fixed cost term is the sum of three terms: F^, F , F
where
:
F, = The cost of safety related overhead,
F^ = The cost required for compliance with govern-
ment standards,
F^ = The cost of elementary long term hazards.
The variable cost term is that cost associated with, and as
a result of some type of accident. It is the sum of five
different terms, each of which is the total cost of all acci-
dents of a particular severity.
n m
VARIABLE COST = I A. + I B. + I C. 4- I D + I E.
=1 ^ i=l ^ i=l i=l 1=1
with:
n
y A. = The sum of A, , A_, ..., A for the first,
.
i- 1 12 n1=1
second, third, etc., accidents of type A. severity. The same
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m 1 k 1
holds for I B. , 1 C. , I D. , I E. where
i=l i=l ^ i=l ^ i=l ^
n
J A. = Total cost of accidents where most severe
i=l
injury resulted in a permanent total disability or death,
m
y B. = Total cost of accidents where most severe
1=1 ^
injury resulted in a temporary total disability requiring
absence from work for more than one week,
J
y C. = Total cost of accidents where most severe
i=l ^
injury resulted in absence from work for less than one week,
k
y D. = Total cost of accidents where most severe
i=l ^
injury resulted in absence from work for less than one day,
1
y E. = Total cost of accidents where there was
i=l ^
no injury but material damage occurred or production was los-
The total cost equation can be written with all its
components as
:
n m 3 k 1
TOTAL COST = F, + F. + F_ + I A. + [ B. + I C. + I D. + J
^ ^
-^1=1^ i=l ^ i=l ^ i = l ^ i=l
where
:




A series of data collection worksheets were developed to
obtain accurate figures for input in the total cost equation.
The first worksheet v/as designed to obtain the values associated
with the fixed cost term of the equation. The second work-
sheet was an exhaustive survey of accident related costs
for input into the variable term of the total cost equation
(see figures 13 and 14, worksheets one and two).
So far a measurement technique of safety performance has
been developed expressed as the overall safety related cost
or "Total Cost" paid by a company in a year. Comparisons of
this figure with previous years "Total Costs" enables the
management to appreciate the effectiveness of the safety
program and contribution of safety department to the company's
goals
.
To appraise the effectiveness of current safety programs
an "Expected Total Cost" figure should be developed.
Step (d) . Determ.ination of the average cost for each
type of accident . Determination of the average cost for each
type of accident may be accomplished by utilizing the following
logical approach. Based on the information collected using
the worksheets discussed above, average cost for each type
of accident A, B, C, D, and E may be computed as:
*^AfAV^ = Average cost for type A accident
F, + F„ + F- , n




DETERMINATION OF FIXED COSTS (ANNUAL BASIS)
Fixed Cost =
^i * ^o + F-
I. F, : Overhead costs
A. Insurance Cost
(Future insurance cost can be estimated by
projecting previous years insurance cost.)
B. Safety Department Salaries
1. Primary safety personnel safety
director's salary
Doctor's salary (if applicable)
Nurse's salary




Attendees at safety meeting
(Number of hours at meetings times
hourly wage plus travel expenses)
C. Percent Cost of company overhead for safety
office (space and equipment)
D. Safety Department operating budget
E. Hiring cost incident to safety
(x-rays, medical/psychological exams)
G. In General other fixed expenses (Depending





II. F„: GOVERNMENT COMPLIANCE COST
A. Safety Equipment
(If not included in safety department
budget) include protective clothing,
goggles, shoes, etc.; fire fighting
equipment (purchase and maintenance)
B. Training
1. Cost of training personnel to
comply with OSHA or other
government standards (include
manhour cost of instructors
and employees plus training
material)
2. Ongoing training (First aid,
driver training, etc.;
include manhour cost of
instructor and trainee




3. Cost of drills (fire fighting
etc., include manhour times
plus all the related to the
drill costs)
C. Cost to acquire or remodel equipment






III. F^: Elementary Long Term Costs
A. Cost to eliminate long term occupational
or health hazards (if not included
previously), include research costs,
inspection and monitoring costs (manhours
times wages, etc.)
B. Cost related to environmental
protection measures
Total F^ Cost
Total Fixed Cost (F^ + F^ + F ) $
Given that we have traced these fixed costs for previous
years we may easily predict the expected fixed cost of next





DETERMINATION OF VARIABLE COSTS (FOR EACH ACCIDENT)
I. Type of Accident
A. Most severe injury resulted in
permanent total disability or death.
B. Most severe injury resulted in
temporary total disability or
absence from work for more than
one working week.
C. Most severe injury resulted in
absence from work less than one
week.
D. Most severe injury resulted in
absence from work for less than
one day.
E. No injury but material damage
occurred or production time
was lost
II. Wages lost
A. Lost time wages - personnel other
than the injured workers
1. Non-injured workers who assisted
the injured workers (hours off
job times hourly wage)
2. Non-injured workers who stopped
work to observe the happenings




3. Non-injured workers who
stopped work due to machinery
shutdown or until replacement
was obtained for injured worker
B. Lost time wages - injured personnel
1. Lost time on job on day of
occurrence (hours times wages)
2. Wages for subsequent days
absent from work.
3. Wages for hours lost for
medical treatment after
returning to work
4. Percent wages lost due to
decreased output after worker
returned to job.
C. Lost time - Supervisors
1. Lost salary/wages in direct
involvement with accident
(on scene assistance or
supervision)
2. Salary/wages required for
filling out necessary
reports and forms
D. Lost time - higher level management
(includes lawyer of the company)
1. Direct involvement with accident
(salary rate times hours spent)
2. Time devoted to follow-up function
(meetings, investigations, not including





1. Wages of personnel required to
get plant back to normal
operating speed
2. Overtime wages (if necessary)
caused by getting plant back
into normal operation
3. Wages of personnel brought
in to clean up accident area
4. Wages of personnel brought
in for non-productive
observation/monitoring (securing
guards, fire watches, observers
to ensure pressure, temperature,
etc., are maintained)
III. Production Lost
A. If lost production was recouped
1. Overtime wage rate differences
to recoup lost production
2. Supervisors salary for overtime
3. Utility costs required for overtime
B. If lost production was not recouped
1. Value of goods lost
2. Cost to purchase goods or
materials from other companies






A. Cost of OSHA fines
B. Cost of production lost due to
government shutdown
C. Cost of obtaining replacement
for injured worker (hiring cost
and training costs)
D. Production loss due to replacement
worker operating below normal output
E. Lost wages due to retraining other
personnel in new or correct procedures
as a result of accident.
V. Medical Cost (other than insurance)
A. Doctor and hospital bills
B. Costs of medical treatment
C. Costs of prosthetic devices
(wheel chair, etc.)
D. Cost of altering work area to
retain disabled worker
E. Anticipated (estimated) increase
in insurance rates as a result of
accident (based on a loss
experience modification factor)
VI. Equipment Cost
A. Replacement or repair of
damaged equipment





C. Cost to rental equipment required
to continued production
VII. Off-Job Accidents
A. Wages lost due to absenteeism
because of off-job accidents
VIII. Other Costs
A. Lost profit on orders lost due
to accident
B. Loss of bonuses to company
C. Demurrage cost
D. Lost profit due to loss of reputation





^B(AV) ^ Average cost for type B accident
^n +m + j +k + 1^ m >-, i1=1
^C(AV) ^ Average cost for type C accident
^n +m + j +k + 1^ j -Si
^D(AV) ~ Average cost for type D accident
F + F + F k
= (-i f £_) + ± y Dn+m + j+k + 1 ^-iii
C , > = Average cost for type E accident
p
-I- p 4- p 1
^n+m + j+k-rl^ 1 . ^^ i
-' 1=1
Since those average costs are approximate figures for
each type of accident a better approximation may be achieved
utilizing the data of as many years as possible.
j
Step (e) . Data analysis study . Data analysis study is a
major step of this approach since by analysing the safety
data information concerning accidents versus occupations or
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departments or days of the week, etc., may be extracted.
This will help to identify hazardous areas. Also the accident
model may be developed. This model is likely to follow a
"Poisson process" or might be a linear or non-linear regression
model depending on the shape of the accident sample distribu-
tion. The development of the accident model enables the
decision maker to make future predictions concerning the
expected number of accidents. Thus, the computation of an
expected cost figure which in the next step becomes feasible.
The use of a computer might be a required tool for completion
of the data analysis study.
Step (f ) . Computation of an expected total cost figure .
Computation of an expected total cost figure based on the
information gained from steps d and e are as follows:
1. Having estimated an average cost figure for the
various types of accidents and having developed an accident
model the "Expected total cost" can be found as a function
of the expected number of accidents and of the various average
costs. This "Expected total cost" figure is a measure of
future safety effectiveness since it indicates the expected
total accident cost of next year, assuming that there are no
changes in the safety program.
2. This figure can be improved by utilizing the cost/
benefit analysis of the last step.
Step (g) . Cost/benefit analysis . Cost/benefit analysis
as discussed in Chapter II. G should be conducted for the most
hazardous areas. This analysis will identify which alternatives
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have the best cost/benefit figures. Adopting these alterna-
tives a reduction in the number of the accidents should be
expected. Thus a new expected number of accidents should be
considered and a "New expected total cost" figure may be
estimated.
This concludes the proposed methodology to the problem of
measuring safety performance. It becomes apparent from the
above discussion that it is not a clear cut methodology and
a lot of work and time should be devoted to develop the various
steps. The difficulties such as correctly completing cost
worksheets; assigning probabilities to human beings and
determining the potential for human error during the develop-
ment of the cost/benefit step; developing the proper accident
model, etc., will be faced and should be overcome.
But regardless of these difficulties this methodology
is a logical approach to the problem of measuring safety
performance.
The following chapter deals with the analysis of real
occupational safety data of the civilian personnel of NPGS
.
The given data were collected as described in step (a) above.
They were coded as per step (b) and were analyzed as per
step (e) . Finally some problem areas concerning the analysis
of real safety data are discussed.
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V. ANALYSIS OF REAL SAFETY DATA
The occupational injuries and illnesses data of the
civilian personnel of the NPGS for a period of four years
(1975-1978) were studied.
The purpose was to indicate with real safety data how
the steps of coding and analyzing real safety data may be
accomplished in a particular case. These steps with the
cost/benefit analysis step as already discussed in Chapter II.
A
are major steps in the proposed methodology. Second, to
appraise that today's needs require the safety manager to
be supported by safety analyst personnel.
The data have been taken from the existing files in the
NPGS "Log of Occupational Injuries and Illnesses" OSHA no
100 and lOOF modified.
Coding of the data . The coding of the data was performed
as follows. Three codes were developed, one for the days
of the week as presented in table II, one for the occupations
as presented in table III, and a last one for the departments
as presented in table IV. The last two codes were based on
the log information, thus it is likely not all the occupations
nor all the departments are included. The coded information
along with some additional information taken from the log
were stored in a computer file, in the following structure.
Computer File FTOIFOOI . This file contains the given
accident data which have been sorted in ascending date order.
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It was then observed that a small percentage (about 10%) of
no cost accidents had occurred on the same day (ties)
.
Since the tied accidents were accounted for only a small
percentage of the overall five years data and since no one
of those produce any total or partial workday loss they were
eliminated. The file was structured as follows. Columns
1-3 refer to the date of the accident (year, month, day)
,
column 4 designates the day of the week according to code I.
Column 5 corresponds to the occupation based on code II.
Column 6 corresponds to the department code III. Column 7
corresponds to the injury or illness code of OSHA, and
columns 8, 9 correspond to the total or partial lost work
days respectively.
Computer file FT02F001 . The structure of the second file
is just a one column four vector structure which represents
the interarrival times in days between accidents, and is
separated into four parts (vectors) each of which corresponds
to one year period (1975-1978).
Analyzing the data . With the use of an IBM-3 60 computer
the following work was completed.
1. Five tables were produced for: the 7 days; 12 months;
4 years; 72 occupations and 45 departments. In those tables
information concerning the total number of accidents (TOT-AC)
,
the type of accident (Types A, B, C for accidents that did
not produce any work days lost, that produced partial days
lost and that produced total days lost respectively) , and
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the total number (TL-DAY) and partial number (PL-DAY) of
days lost are available.
2. Developed the following 5 charts for years, months,
weeks, occupations and departments vs total number of acci-
dents, total and partial days lost.
3. Histograms of the interarrival (or interevents)
times of the accidents were developed for each year and each
week in order to gain an understanding of whether the acci-
dents were following any particular distribution pattern.
For some weeks, where the sample sizes was too small, that is
less than 10 accidents, it was not possible to get a histo-
gram. With the histograms all the information concerning
central tendency, spread, higher central moments were avail-
able.
4. Having developed the histograms it was reasonable to
assume that the distribution of the interarrival times of
each year were following an exponential distribution with
means y, = 6.471, y^ = 4.329, u-^ = 5.166, and y. = 5.18 5 for
the accidents of the years 1975 through 1978 respectively.
For verification of the above a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test was
performed by means of the NKSl existing library subroutine.
Results . Results based on the above work were as follows
From the developed tables and charts more accidents occur on
Fridays and less on Sundays and Saturdays but more or less
the number of accidents is evenly spread during the week
days iMonday to Fridays.
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Concerning the months, January and December are the
months with lowest frequency of accidents where February
and November are those with the greatest frequency. But
again more or less the accidents are evenly spread during all
months. Concerning occupations those with the largest number
of accidents are the clerks, laborers, pipefitters, gardeners
and food service employees. A total number of 4 09 work-days
lost and 28 partial-days lost occurred.
Concerning departments those with the largest number of
accidents were the Public Works, Naval Exchange, COMO and
supply departments.
Cost Analysis . A cost analysis was performed based on
rough cost figures given by the safety department of the
NPGS. Those figures were an average direct cost of 8.38
dollars/hour for every occupation and the amount of 300
dollars for a "back case" injury which roughly speaking repre-
sents the medical bills.
Based on the above given figures it was not possible to
determine a total cost figure as discussed in Chapter IV and
only a rough total cost estimate was evaluated as follows.
Daily average direct cost figure = Average hourly cost x
8 hrs = 8.38 x 8 = 67.04 dollars/day lost.
Since there were
409 total days lost x 67.04 dollars/day lost




28 partial days lost x (^^^^) dollars/half day = 938.56
Thus rough average total direct cost = 27,419.36 + 938.56
= 28,357.92 dollars.
A 4 year Accident Model of the NPGS (from 1975-1978) .
According to Ross (1970) a stochastic process {N(t), t _> }
is said to be a counting process if N(t) represents the total
number of events which have occurred up to time t. A particu-
larly important counting process is the Poisson process
defined as follows;
The counting process {N(t), t _> } is said to be a
Poisson process if
(a) N(0) =
(b) {N(t), t >_ 0} has independent increments. That is
the number of events which occur in disjoint time
intervals are independent
(c) The number of events in any interval of length t
is Poisson distributed with mean At. That is, for
all s, t >
Pr{N(t+s) -N(s) =n} = e""" ' , n = 0, 1,
II •
From condition (c) it follows that a Poisson process has
stationary increments, that is the distribution of the numbers
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of events which occur in any interval of time depends only
on the length of the time interval, and also that
E[N(t)] = Xt and X is called the rate of the process.
The following theorems concerning the Poisson process are
essential for the establishment of the accident model.
Theorem 1 . If {N(t), t >_ 0} is a Poisson process then the
inter-arrival (or inter-event) times (Tj^/ i ^ 0}
are independent identically distributed exponential
(A)
^1 = ^1 ^2 = ^l"-'^2 s T =Tt+T„
+ . . .+t
tn-1 1 2 n-1
S = Tt + . . .+T
n 1 n
n
Corollary 1 . If (N , t >_ } is a Poisson process then the
waiting times {S„ = T, + . . . + T„ , n > 1 } are
^ n 1 n —
Gamma distributed with parameters n and X
.
Theorem 2. If the inter-event times {T^, i ^ 1} of a
counting process {N , t >_ } are independent
identically distributed Exponential (X) then
{N(t), t > 0} is a Poisson process with rate X
To develop the accident model of the NPGS it was assumed
that N(t) = the number of accidents which have occured at
NPGS at or prior to time t, where the time t is measured in
days.
If T , T - Tw T^ -T^, ... represent the interarrival (or
inter-event) times of the first, second, third, ... accidents
1 1 Q

then those interarrival times are independent and identically
distributed. Examining these interarrival times for each
year separately and having performed the appropriate
Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests (see summary of results in table V)
we accept the hypothesis that the interarrival times are
independent and identically distributed random variables
each with an exponential distribution with mean y, = 6.4716,
y^ = 4.329, y^ = 5.166, y^ = 5.185 (X^ = 0.15) {X^ = 0.22)
{\ = 0.19) (A, = 0.19), where y., A. are the mean and
parameter of the exponential distribution of the data of the
.th
1 year.
Thus according to theorem 2 above, each year from 1975 to
1978 the occupational injuries and illnesses models were
following a Poisson process, with rates
A^ = 0.15 accidents/day for 1975
A^ = 0.22 accidents/day for 1976
A^ = 0.19 accidents/day for 1977
A. = 0.19 accidents/day for 1978
Based on these findings we may consider that the 1979
accident model is likely to follow a Poisson process with
rate
A^ + A2 + A3 + A^
_
.75









. Basically three computer programs were
developed named as B, DS, and C. Program B was developed
to calculate the interarrival times of the accidents.
Program DS was developed to produce the necessary tables and
plots as already discussed. Program C was developed to
produce histograms and perform Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests as
discussed.
Discussion and conclusions . Having analyzed a four year
accident data of the civilian personnel of NPGS it was found
that the 1975 accident model was following a Poisson process
with rate A = 0.15. This was based on a Kolmogorov-test
where at a level of significance a = 0.10 the accident inter-
arrival times were accepted to be exponentially distributed
(A = 0.15)/ thus the process as already discussed was Poisson.
Based on the same argument it was found that the 1976,
1977, and 1978 accident models were Poisson distributed.
By utilizing these results it was found reasonable to predict
the 1979 accident safety model as Poisson distributed too.
The validity of this model, as well as most accident
models, for future predictions is based upon the assumption
that no change in the safety program has been accomplished.
If so the expected number of future accidents may be predicted,
But in general this might not be true since the moment an
accident occurs or after the investigation process of an
i accident have been completed some causes and problem areas
become apparent and correction measures are established.
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Those measures influence the model and future accident pre-
diction becomes a problem. But at least this model can be
used as an upper bound for future expected accidents since
any corrections made will result in accident reduction.
Another problem area is that in general the model will not
account for each type of accident but only for the total num-
ber. In such a case further analysis of the accident data
might be necessary to determine the distribution of each type
of accident. In cases where there is insufficient accident
data, separate distributions for each type of accident might
not be feasible. Statistical accuracy requires a large sample
size. Similar accidents occurring on like equipment may not
be frequent enough to yield accurate estimates of probability.
Another important factor that influences the development
of an accident model is the complexity of the structure of
the organization. That is companies or organizations with
more homogeneous activities should be modeled much more easily
than those with complex and different types of activities.
Thus the need for studying and continuously analyzing the
accident model is a must for complex organizations. By sub-
modeling a complex organization, that is by dividing the
organization into homogeneous subsets (such as same depart-
ments, occupations, etc.) each of which is easier to be
modeled separately. Developing those individual models the
safety efficiency of individual departments may be studied
as well as the overall safety corporate efficiency.
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Though the modeling aspect is in many cases complex and
the findings are approximations based on the assumptions of
certain probability distributions nevertheless close and
continuous study of accident data reveal a lot of information
which will help in prevention of accidents as well as estima-
tion of the cost due to such accidents.
This safety performance field is an ever expanding area












































27 Ser. Sta. Attend.
28 Warehouseman
29 Plate maker






























57 Visual Display Art
58 Library Tech.
59 Voucher Examiner
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Variables : In Boolean algebra are considered the
objects, classes, or elements (symbols are letters A, B, X,
etc. ) .
Universe : The entire collection or group of all the
variables under consideration
" + " = Read as OR is used for the OR operation
" * " = Read as AND is used for the AND operation
"
-
" = Read as NOT (negation) is used for negation.
For example A (Read A NOT) means the opposite of A that is
if A had value 0, A has the value 1 and vice-versa (Or true
and not true instead of 1 and 0)
.
Null and All Elements {0 and I) ; represents all the
classes that do not and all the classes that do exist
respectively.
SUMMARY OF BOOLEAN IDENTITIES
X+0 = X{0 is always 0) X-Y = Y-X
X+1 = 1(1 is always 1) X+(Y+Z) = (X+Y)+Z
X+X = X X(Y-Z) = (X-Y)
Z
X+X = 1 X(Y+Z) = X-Y+X-Z
X-1 = X X+X-Y = X
X-0 = X(X+Y) = X
X-X = X X+Y-Z = (X+Y) (X+Z)
X-X = X+X-Y = X+Y
X+Y = Y+X X-Y = X+Y
X = X X+Y = X-Y
X-Y +X-Y = X

COMPUTER OUTPUT
"ACCIDENT TABLES AND PLOTS"
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TABLE FO^ DAYS OF WEEK
DAYS Tn--AC -y PE-A 'YPE-B TYPE-C TL-CAY DL-DAY
i 7 c 7
2 49 7 2 40 79 7
3 51 10 3 39 58 21
4 46 11 35 145
5 49 6 43 23
6 52 9 43 89
7 17 2 15 15
132

^AE LE np M 3MTHS
MIN-^HS JlT-t^Z TYP E-^ TYPE!-3 TYPE-C TL-DAY PL-DAY
1 14 5 9 31
2 25 3 1 16 154 10
J 20 2 18 9
4 19 1 18 20
5 22 1 21 10
6 22 3 1 18 10 3
7 ZZ 4 1 17 25 2
8 26 5 1 20 45 4
9 27 3 24 14
10 26 5 1 21 34 9
11 30 8 ZZ 57




YEAR TOT'-AC TYPE-A TYP£-b TYPE-C TL--DAY PL-DAY
I 53 7 3 43 39 9
2 82 14 1 67 92 10
3 66 14 52 217




CCUP TOT-AC TYP Ef-A TYPE- B TYPE-C TL-OAY DL-DAY
i 19 7 2 11 63 19
2 1 1
-2 26 1 1 24 6 4
4 2 1 1 2 C
5 8 2 n 6 24
b 2 1 1 3 c
7 1 1
3 2 1 1 16 c
9 1 1 c
10 5 1 4 10
ii 43 9 34 38
12 4 4 c
13 6 1 5 14
14 3 C 3 c
15 10 2 1 7 95
lb 1 C 1
17 4 1 3 2
18 9 2 7 3 c
19 2 C 2 c
2 1 1 c
21 4 c 4
Zl 1 1
23 1 1
24 3 c 3
Z5 5 c 5 c
2b
27 1 c 1
28 7 1 6 5 c
29 1 1 G 6
30 c
31 3 1 2 4
32
33 1 1
34 9 9 c
65 10 4 6 37
30 1 c 1 c
37 9 9
38 7 2 5 3
39 2 2 c
40 ^ 3
41 2 c 2 c
42 1 1 2 c
43 4 c 4
44 1 1 c
45 9 9 c
4o 2 c 2
47 1 c 1 c




52 1 c 1
5j c
54 2 2
55 1 1 11
56 1 1 c
57 1 G 1 c
53 6 1 5 3
59 1 c 1 c
60 I 1 c
61 1 1 7
62 2 2 9 c
63 1 1
64 1 c 1 c
65 1 1 10 c
66 1 i c
67 2 c 2
68 1 1 c
69 1 1 38














TYDE-B TYPE-C TL-DAY PL-DAY
L 90 15 5 71 219 28
2 53 14 39 55
J 3 3
4 3 1 2 3
5 2 c 2
6 1 1
7 I 1















2j 2 1 1 7 c
2^ 10 10
25 I 1
26 1 1 6
21 7 7
28 1 I
29 1 1 23 c
30 1 1
31 2 2
32 21 7 14 47
33 1 a 1
34 6 6
35
36 8 2 c 6 21
37 4 4
38 9 1 8 3
39 2 2
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C ^ACCEPTS AS IMPJTS THE ACCIDE^JTS ACCORDIMG 11 THE ^
C *CHP1N3L3GICAL OCCURANCE AND PRODUCES TABLES CF *
C '^'ACCIDENTS FOR WEE KS-MQMHS-YE ARS-Q CCUp AT IONS- *
C *CtFAR""MENTS .ALS PRODUCES PLOTS OF
C *yE&RS VS NO OF ACC IDE NTS ;TOT AL AND PARTIAL DAYS LOST=*
C *MONTHS VS THE ABOVE *
C *DAVS OF WEEKS VS THE ABOVE *
C *OCCUPA^ICNS VS ~HE ABTVE *




I MTEGER=!=2 FORM(27),YEt3) ,MON( 3J,GCCUP(3)tDEP(3)
CI MENS ION IDAY{7, 7 ), IMGN{ 12,7), I YEA (4, 7) , lOCC { 72, 7) ,
iIDE°(45,7 ), IRE
-C( 9) ,X(72 ), Y(72 } ,Zi72} ,W(7 2J
CAT A FORM /2h D,2HAY,2HS , 2H , 2HTG, 2HT-, 2HAC , 2H , 2H
iTY,
-2HPE,2H-A ,2H ,2 H"^Y ,2HP E ,2ri-B ,2H ,2HTY,
12HPE,2H-C,2H ,
-2HTL,2H-0,2HAY,2H ,2HPL,2K-D ,2HAY/
DA-^A YE/2H Y,2HEA,2HP /
DATA M0N/2HM0,2riNT, 2HHS/
DATA 0CCUP/2H0C, 2HCL,2HP /
DATA DEP/2HDE ,2HPA,2HRT/
DA^A I0AY/^9*0/, IMGN/84*0/, lY EA/28*0/, IGCC/ 50 4*0/, ID
C
C PUT THE INDEX IN FIRST Cr^LUv^N OF EACH TABLE
CO 2 1=1,72
IF( I.GT.4 ) GO TO 11
IYEA( I ,1) =1
11 1F( I.G'.7 ) GO TO 12




















IF( I.GT.12) GO TO 13
IMOMI ,1) =1
IF( 1,GT .45) GO ^1 14
IDEP{ I,i) = I
I3CC{ I ,1) =1
CONTINUE
UPDATE TABLES F CR DAYS MONTHS YEARS OCCUPATIONS
OEP/R^NErrS
t^EAD(l,100,END=20) ( I REG (I ) ,1 =1 , 9)




IF( J.GE,6) GO TO 30
IF( J.E0.3.AND.IREC(8) .EO.O) G0~0 1
IF (J.E0.4.AN0.REC(9 J.EO.O ) GO TO 1
IF( J.E3.5.AND.(I^EC( 8) .ME.0.0R.IREC(9)
I.HELP = 1
lO^Y (IREC(4 J, J)= IDAY (IREC{4), J) + Ih£LP
I-^ONK IREC (2) , J)=IMON(IREC (2) , J)-HHELP
IYEA( (IRECi l)-74) tJ)=IYEA((lREC{lJ-74j,JJ+Ir£L=
I0CC(IR£C{5) , J) = I 0CC(I5EC(5 ), Ji + II-EL =
IDEP{ IREC{6), J)=nE'5 (I^EC(6) , J) +IHELP
CONTINUE
GO ^C 13
WRITE THE INJURIES FOR DAYS MONTHS YE^RS OCCUPATICNS
DEPARTVENTS
WR ITE(6,201)
FORMAT( 1H1t2X,////t17X, ' TABLE FOR CAYS OF WEEK',
1//)
WR I'E ( 6» 300)F0RV|
FORMATC 4X ,27A2)
WRI-E{6,2 00) ((I DAY (I,J),J=l,7i,I = l,7)
WRnE(6,301 )















FTPMAK IHi, 2X,////» 17X, ' TABLE
1//)
CO 16 1=1 ,3
F1RM( I)=MON( I )
CQN-INUE
WR1TE{6,300 )FnDM
^<RITE(6,200) (( IMONd , J) ,J=1,7) ,1 =1,12)
VnRITEC 6,401)







F0R^<AT(1H1,2X ,////, 17X, • TABLE OF OCCUPATION',
1//)












WRI-E(6,2 00) ( (iOEP (I, J), J=l,7) ,1 = 1,45)
FORMAT {7X, I2,5X, 13, 5X, I3,5X,I3, 5X, 12, 4X, I 5, 2X,I 5)
PLCT NUMBER of ACCIDENTS VS DAYS OF WEEK, YEAPS, MONTHS,




GJ "Q (91 ,92 ,93»94,95), J
















93 CO 5 1 = 1,7
X( I )=I
Y( I)=IDAY (1,2 )
2{ I)=IDAy ( 1,6 )




94 CO 6 1 = 1,72
X( I )=I
Y{I)=10CC(I,2 )
z( n=incc (1,6 J

















99 CALL PLOTPCX,Zt>l fl)
URI^E(6,700i
























PROGRAM TO CALCUL^^TE THE INTERARRIVAL TIMES
ACCEPTS AS INPUT "HE FILE FTOlFOOl £N0
CALCULATES THE IN'EPA^RIVAL TIMES OF THE
ACCIDENITS WHICH FILES INTO FILE FT02FOOI
01 MENSICM ^0" (100) , CIFdOO J, IMTABdZ)





READ IM THE DAYS OF GCC URANCE OF the ACCIDENTS
REAC(i,100) IY,IM,IC










IF (IM.EQ.O) GO ^0 10
00 1 1=1, IM
IDAY= IDAY + IMTAB ( I )
CONTINUE
IDAV=IDAY+ID
IF (I^E'.EO. 2 .AMD.IM .GT .2) IDAY= IDAY+ 1
TOT ( ICJ=ID4y
GO TO 20


















TAKE CARE OF LEAP YEAR







PROGRAM "C" TO PRODUCE HISTOGRAMS
AND PERFORM K-S TESTS
161

C* THIS PROGRAM ACCEPTS AS INPUTS THE INTERARRIVAL TI^-ES *
C- AND PRCDUCE FOR EACH YEAR CGRRESPGNDIMG HISTOGRAMS; *
C*£MPIRiC^L PDF ;STATISTICS ^^JD PERFORM K_S TEST GOODNESS*









C GIVE LAMDA FOR EACH YEAR
CAT4 VLAM / .1545, .23093, .19354, .1955/
IMET=0
IMET=IMET+1
VL=VLAM( I VIET )
IC=0
IC=IC+1
READ IM INTER^R^IVAL TIMES
REAC(2,100) XdC)
F0RNA^(F5 .1 J
iF(X(iCJ.ME.O .) GO TO 10
IC= IC-i
USE GF LIBRARY 5UBRCU"INES TO PRODUCE HISTOGRi^S
AND PERFORM K-S GOODNESS OF FIT TESTS
CALL HISTF(X, ICO)
CALL NKSl (PCF,X,IC ,FDIF,IER)
WRITE(6,200; {DDIF( I ), 1 = 1,6), lER
F0RMAT(2X,6F3.4, 15)
















SUBROUTINE RECUIREO BY ""HE NKSl LIBRARY SUB'^GUTINE
-^1 CALCULATE TI-E")o iTICftL VALUE FOR EXPONENTIAL
SUBROUTIME PDF(X,Y)
CJMHOr^ /LAMDA/VL










OCCUPATIONAL IjNJURIES AND ILLNESSES OATA CF N.P.G.S.
THAT HAVE BEEN CGDEC JNDEP FILE FTOiFOOi AS FOLLnwS
A=YEARtB=vaNTH,C=DAY»D=OAY HFTHE W EEK( 1= SUNOA Y, E TC . )
E=OCCUPATION< SEE OCCUPATICN C ODE) ,F =DEPARTNEN"^ ( S EE CEP CODE)
G=QSHA INJURY CGDE(SEE CSHA CnOE J
,
H=TJT A L WORKDAYS LOST
i=PARTIAL WORKDAYS LOST
A BCDEFGHI




75 1 20 2 2 1 10
75 1 21 3 3 1 IC c
75 1 22 4 4 2 10 2
75 <£ 14 6 5 3 IC c
75 2 25 3 6 4 10 3
75 2 26 4 8 8 10 16
75 2 28 6 7 5 24
75 2 14 6 8 6 10 C
75 3 17 2 5 2 10 c
75 3 19 4 9 7 10
75 3 2^ 2 10 9 10 c
75 4 21 2 12 11 IC
75 4 24 5 13 1 10
75 5 2 6 4 2 10 c
75 5 6 3 14 3 IC
75 5 8 5 13 14 10
75 12 3 15 1 IC c
75 5 24 7 16 3 1 c
75 6 2 2 15 1 10 3
75 6 12 5 11 2 IC c
75 6 17 3 11 13 10
75 6 26 5 3 1 10
75 7 1 3 3 1 IC
75 7 a 3 3 1 1
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75 7 15 3 18 15 10
75 7 22 3 17 i IC 2
75 e A 2 3 1 IC 4
75 8 15 6 11 2 10 10
75 9 2 3 11 16 IC C
75 S 1 1 19 17 10
75 9 10 4 11 2 10
75 9 17 4 20 18 IC c
75 9 18 5 21 4 10
75 9 20 7 1 1 10
75 9 21 1 3 1 IC
75 9 24 4 22 19 10
75 9 30 3 23 16 IC c
75 iC 3 6 11 1 10
75 10 4 7 11 2 10 c
75 10 7 3 11 19 IC c
75 IC 10 6 1 1 IC c
75 10 15 4 10 21 10
75 10 17 6 25 22 10 c
75 iC 31 6 24 2 10 c
75 11 3 2 11 23 1 c c
75 11 6 5 11 24 IC
75 11 13 5 11 25 10
75 11 17 2 27 2 10 c
75 11 19 4 15 1 IC 5
75 11 26 4 11 I 10 2
75 12 6 7 11 2 10 c
75 12 9 3 28 2 10 c
76 1 16 6 11 1 10
76 1 2C 3 29 26 10 6
76 1 22 5 3 7 27 10
76 2 2 2 31 28 10
76 2 3 3 1 1 IC 10
76 2 12 5 11 2 IC 2
76 2 13 6 11 1 10
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76 2 13 4 34 16 10
7o ^ 21 7 11 2 IC C
7g 2 21 2 11 2 IC c
76 2 27 6 5 29 10 23
76 3 3 4 11 30 10
76 3 9 3 25 32 IC 4
76 3 12 6 17 1 10
76 3 17 4 5 2 10 C
76 3 25 5 13 1 IC c
76 4 2 6 3 1 10
76 4 5 2 3 1 10
76 4 a 5 1 1 10
76 ^ li 2 15 1 IC
76 4 It 6 36 IS 10
76 4 la 1 35 33 10
76 4 2J 6 18 36 IC c
76 4 26 2 35 2 10 c
76 4 30 6 3 1 1
76 5 4 3 11 2 10
76 5 10 2 la 1 IC c
76 5 17 2 35 z 10
76 5 18 3 11 2 10
76 5 19 4 37 31 IC c
76 c 20 5 37 27 1 c
76 5 27 5 3 2 10 c
76 5 2^ 5 4C 1 1 C c
76 6 2 4 37 31 10 3
76 6 3 5 38 1 10 c
76 6 7 11 2 1 C c
76 6 3 3 37 27 1 Q c
76 6 14 2 39 22 10 c
76 6 15 3 35 2 IC c
76 6 17 5 43 32 26 c
76 6 Zc 3 42 2 10 2
76 6 24 5 1 1 IC c
76 6 25 6 3 32 10
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76 6 29 3 15 1 IC
76 7 7 4 43 24 IC C
76 7 9 6 44 1 10
76 7 10 7 il 2 IC C
76 7 13 3 35 2 10 12
76 7 14 4 45 1 10
76 7 17 7 46 32 10 c
76 7 19 2 3 1 iC
76 8 2 2 28 24 10 C
76 8 3 3 47 1 10 c
76 8 17 3 13 1 1 14
76 8 19 5 10 34 10
76 8 23 2 19 27 IC c
76 e 24 3 57 2 10
76 8 25 4 3 1 10
76 8 26 5 11 2 10 c
76 8 27 6 50 3Z 10
76 8 28 7 11 2 10 IC
76 9 A 7 5 32 10 c J
76 9 16 5 IC 32 29 1 c
76 9 22 4 45 1 10
76 9 27 2 3 1 IC
76 9 28 3 1 1 IC 2
76 10 7 5 38 2 10 1
76 iO 8 6 18 2 IC 1
76 IC 21 5 48 38 1 C c
76 10 29 6 5 32 10 c
76 11 3 4 34 1 10
76 li. IC 4 40 1 10 G
76 11 11 5 11 1 IC 1
76 11 19 6 34 16 10
76 11 22 2 15 1 10
76 il 2i 3 11 24 10 c
76 11 24 4 11 39 IC c
76 11 29 2 31 1 10 4
76 12 1 4 1 1 10
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76 J. 2 2 J 38 1 IC c
76 12 13 2 40 1 iC
76 12 20 2 21 4 10
77 1 ^ 3 38 1 IC 2
77 1 3 7 51 36 10
77 1 17 2 35 32 IC 2C
77 1 27 5 52 37 IC c
77 2 4 6 54 39 10
77 2 £ 3 12 37 10
77 2 c 4 1 1 IC c
77 2 11 6 55 36 IC 11
77 2 16 4 15 1 10 90
77 2 17 5 38 1 10
77 ^ 18 6 35 2 10 c
77 2 26 7 3 2 IC c
77 2 23 2 3 3? 10 6
77 3 3 5 25 40 10
77 « 11 6 12 19 1 c c
77 w 14 2 56 4L 10
77 3 1 7 5 13 5 10
77 J 21 2 11 38 IC c
77 3 23 4 14 3Z 10
77 "3 25 6 43 32 10 c
77 ^ z£ 2 58 38 IC c
77 4 1 6 1 L 10 20
77 4 12 3 11 43 10
77 4 23 7 43 32 10 c
77 5 c c^ 18 36 IC c
77 5 20 6 11 40 10
77 5 24 J 59 24 IC c
77 5 28 7 28 32 IC c
77 6 10 6 60 24 10
77 6 15 4 1 1 10
77 6 22 4 61 23 IC 7
77 6 23 5 62 2 10 1 Q
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77 7 7 5 12 22 10
77 7 11 2 46 2 10 c
77 7 15 6 18 2 IC c
77 7 25 2 1 1 10 3
77 8 4 5 62 16 10 8
77 8 c 6 63 24 IC C
77 8 14 1 64 2 10 c
77 8 15 2 38 1 IC c
77 e 19 6 11 2 IC c
77 8 31 4 11 2 10 3
77 9 2 6 45 1 10 C
77 9 7 4 33 1 10
77 9 20 3 34 15 10
77 9 22 c; 11 2 10 c
77 9 26 2 1 a 1 10 2
77 9 27 3 41 42 10
77 9 29 5 15 1 IC
77 9 30 b 66 24 10
77 iO 7 6 3 1 IC
77 1 o 13 c 45 1 IC c
77 10 19 4 3 1 10 J
77 10 25 3 3 1 10
77 10 27 5 34 1 IC c
77 31 2 6 37 IC c
77 2 4 68 35 10 c
77 3 5 67 41 10
77 4 6 35 ^:>Z IC 1
77 7 2 15 1 IC
77 14 2 69 1 10 38
77 15 3 58 33 10 G
77 2J 4 34 19 IC c
77 29 3 45 1 IC c
77 12 2 6 21 22 1 c
77 12 7 4 58 2,^ IC
78 34 19 10
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78 1 10 3 38 1 10
73 i 2C 6 45 1 IG C
78 2 3 6 1 1 10
73 2 8 4 34 1 10
78 2 17 6 11 2 IC 3
78 2 23 5 18 2 IC C
78 3 7 3 28 24 10
78 3 22 4 70 40 IC C
78 3 25 7 28 32 10 5
78 4 1 7 11 2 10 d
78 4 4 3 71 34 10
78 4 c 4 58 38 IC C
78 4 £ 5 28 2 10 G
78 4 9 1 24 2 10 C
78 5 1 2 45 1 IC c
78 5 2 3 72 34 10
73 5 3 4 65 36 29 IC
78 5 9 3 3 1 1 C c
73 5 21 1 25 19 1 C
78 6 14 4 35 32 10 c
78 6 28 4 3 36 IC c
78 6 30 6 13 1 10
78 7 5 4 11 2 IC 4
78 7 13 5 51 2 IC c
78 7 14 6 11 2 10
78 7 2i 6 5 32 IC 1
78 7 25 3 3 L 10
73 7 27 5 72 34 10
78 7 31 2 10 34 10 c
78 £ 1 3 37 17 1 c c
73 3 4 6 5 32 10 c
78 8 6 3 j>9 1 29 c
76 £ IC 5 3 1 29
78 8 14 2 3 32 10 c
78 8 17 5 25 12 10 c
73 8 21 2 11 45 1 C
1 71

78 8 24 5 11 1 10
76 9 11 2 45 34 IC c
73 9 12 3 25 12 10 c
78 9 21 5 37 27 10
78 9 22 6 15 1 IC c
78 9 29 6 14 2 99 3
78 iO c 5 3 1 10 c
73 iC e 6 1 1 IC 1 9
78 10 10 3 17 1 10
73 10 14 7 54 36 10
78 10 1^ 2 11 2 IC c
78 IC 18 4 58 38 IC 3
73 10 26 5 1 1 10
78 10 30 2 37 27 10
78 IC 31 3 1 1 IC ic 9
78 11 7 3 58 38 1 c c
73 11 8 4 11 2 10 3
78 11 12 1 37 27 10
78 il 1^ 3 1 1 10 3
78 11 17 6 67 41 IC c
73 11 20 2 1 1 10
78 11 27 2 28 24 10
78 ii 3C 5 13 1 IC c
78 1^ 4 2 45 32 IC c
78 12 c 3 17 1 10
78 12 6 4 11 38 10
78 12 11 Z 1 1 IC
78 12 13 4 3 1 IC c
78 12 15 6 24 41 10
78 12 16 6 41 44 10
78 12 1£ 2 21 19 IC c
78 12 21 ^ 34 37 1 C c
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